DECEMBER 1962

MONTHLY REVIEW

AN INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST MAGAZINE

VOL. 14

8

THE CUBAN CRISIS IN PERSPECTIVE

THE EDITORS

ANDES AND SIERRA MAESTRA

SEBASTIAN SALAZAR BONDY

Marxism: Religion and Science JOAN ROBINSON

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTENTS

VOLUME FOURTEEN NUMBER EIGHT DECEMBER 1962

REVIEW OF THE MONTH: The Cuban Crisis in Perspective 401
ANDES AND SIERRA MAESTRA by Sebastian Salazar Bondy 414
MARXISM: RELIGION AND SCIENCE by Joan Robinson 423
ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WESTERN EUROPE
by Theodore Prager 436
WORLD EVENTS by Scott Nearing 445
BOOKS:
REPLY TO MR. KOFSKY by David Horowitz 451
REJOINDER by Frank Kofsky 455
THE SEED BENEATH THE FALLOUT SHELTER by Alexander Saxton 458

MONTHLY REVIEW: Published monthly except July and August when bimonthly, and copyright, ©1962, by Monthly Review, Inc. Second class postage paid at New York, N. Y.

EDITORIAL AND BUSINESS: 333 Sixth Avenue, New York 14, New York. Telephone: CHelsea 2-6494.

NEWSSTAND DISTRIBUTOR: B. De Boer, 188 High Street, Nutley, N. J.

SUBSCRIPTION PRICE: One Year—$5; two years—$9.
By 1st class mail—United States $7; everywhere else $8.
By air mail—No. America $9; So. America $14; Europe $18; Asia and Africa $24.

EDITORS: Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy.

NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

We are very pleased that so many of you are recognizing the value of MR Press books as Xmas presents and are taking advantage of the current book sale (see double spread on pages 432-433 below). One reader sent in an order for $65 worth of books and another for $50. They know a good buy when they see it. There's still time to get in on these bargains, but not much. Better act right away.

The *Library Journal* quotes the head of the Gifts and Exchanges department of the Yale University library on John Beecher's *Report to the Stockholders* as follows: "Descended from the family of Abolitionist fame, John Beecher was born in New York in 1904. He has been a steel worker, rancher, seaman, and professor of English and sociology. In 1961 he was a participant in the San Francisco-Moscow Walk for Peace and presently, with his wife Barbara, operates a private press whose fine printing has won several awards. . . . In rhythms and tone often akin to Whitman, he writes with great intensity of feeling, mostly about social injustice. . . . Although several of the causes for which he speaks have been wholly or partially satisfied, others most certainly have not; and, as a part of the continuing debate which is a sign of America's greatness, this volume, both for its artistry and the sincerity of its feeling, deserves a place upon the shelves of all libraries that can afford it." This was written about the original limited edition which sold for $10 a copy. MR Press is now publishing an offset edition, in most respects hard to distinguish from the original, and is offering it at $3 a copy, with a special pre-

(*continued on inside back cover*)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CUBAN CRISIS IN PERSPECTIVE

Hard as it may be in these days of uncertainty, tension, and anguish, we must make every effort to maintain a sense of history and to see events of the present in the perspective of past and future. And nowhere is this more necessary than in the case of the Cuban crisis which reached such a frightful climax in the last days of October and is still very far from being resolved nearly a month later.

We have said it many times before and will say it many times again: the Cuban Revolution is no isolated event affecting a small island inhabited by a mere two-tenths of one percent of the world's population. It was and is a phase, the most important phase to date, of the Latin American Revolution which in turn is an integral part of the great 20th-century world-wide revolution of the exploited and hungry nations against the yoke of colonialism and the misery of underdevelopment. These undoubted facts give to Cuba an importance out of all proportion to its size; nay more, they assign to Cuba a role in the historical drama unfolding before our eyes which is in many respects just as important as that of the United States and the Soviet Union. For the policies of both of the superpowers are quite literally dominated by their relations and attitudes to the world revolution, and at this particular historical moment little Cuba represents the world revolution. Any interpretation which ignores or belittles this, which sees in Cuba merely a pawn in a chess game between the giants is thoroughly false. Cuba is no longer a mere object of history, it is an actor in its own right and one with which the others must reckon, regardless of their inclinations or wishes.

In tracing the genesis of the present crisis, the first fact that has to be taken into account is that from the moment it was clear to American policy-makers that Fidel Castro was bent on carrying through a genuine social revolution, it became

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the overriding aim of Washington's Cuba policy to overthrow his regime. No target date was set, no specific plan of action espoused; but among those who really wield power, there was no serious dispute about the aim.

This soon became evident to Castro and his colleagues, some of whom no doubt knew in advance that it was bound to happen. To their revolutionary task at home was now added the task of surviving the implacable hostility of their infinitely more powerful neighbor. The subsequent course of events in Cuba has been dominated by the regime's efforts to carry out these two tasks simultaneously.

The fact that the pre-revolutionary Cuban economy was completely dependent on trade with the United States (60 percent of exports to the U. S., 75 percent of imports from the U.S.) put powerful weapons at the disposal of Washington, and the early attempts to undermine or overthrow the Revolution all involved various forms of economic pressure. First, it was the withholding of badly needed aid and threats to reduce the Cuban sugar quota. When these methods failed to induce the revolutionary regime to change its course, the U. S. proceeded to the action stage. The big oil companies cut off the vital flow of petroleum, and the Eisenhower administration closed the U. S. market to Cuban sugar, measures which, judging from the history of relations between advanced and underdeveloped countries, should have brought the Castro government down in short order. Fortunately for the Cubans, however, they were able to turn to the Russians for assistance, and the Russians had both the will and the ability to provide what was needed. Thenceforth, the Cuban Revolution could be assured of survival no matter what economic weapons the U. S. might employ.

As we now know from the revelations of Nixon and others, Washington began to make preparations to use military force against Cuba as early as the spring of 1960, several months before the rupture of economic relations. With the demonstration of the impotence of economic warfare, these preparations were stepped up. By the summer of 1960, it was becoming increasingly clear that the U. S. had only two alternatives: either fight the Cuban Revolution with guns and bombs or ac-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cept its existence and learn to live with it in peace. Washington chose the first course.

Just as they had turned to the Russians for economic help, the Cubans now sought military protection in the same quarter. The response was of two kinds. First, the Russians (and the Czechs) provided the modern weapons which the army and militia badly needed and which, owing to a U. S. embargo and pressure on its NATO allies, the Cubans had not been able to buy in the West. This was sufficient to enable Cuba itself to deal with a U. S.-backed invasion of Cuban exiles and/or Latin American mercenaries. But the Cuban army, no matter how well equipped, could obviously not repulse a direct attack by the United States. Premier Khrushchev therefore issued a warning to the U. S. that the Soviet Union could not remain indifferent to an American attack on Cuba and had the necessary means of retaliation from Soviet soil. We cannot, of course, know what was in the minds of the Soviet leaders, but it seems reasonable to suppose that their aim was to achieve for Cuba a status similar to that enjoyed by Turkey and other U. S. allies bordering on the Soviet Union. The USSR had accepted the fact that these countries were under U. S. protection and probably hoped that the U. S. would similarly accept the fact that Cuba was under Soviet protection.

It is clear in retrospect that Washington did not as yet fully understand the situation and still hoped to be able to accomplish its purpose without the direct commitment of U. S. armed forces. Hence the next phase was dominated by political and military preparations for the Bay of Pigs invasion of April, 1961 (San José meeting of the OAS, prohibition of travel from the U. S. to Cuba, breaking off of diplomatic relations, training the exiles' expeditionary force, and so on). This phase, of course, ended with the debacle at Playa Giron, April 17-19, 1961.

The era of illusions was not yet over, however. At about this time, the Cuban economy was entering a period of grievous troubles owing to a number of non-recurring and largely unrelated causes: the defection of experienced technicians and managerial personnel, the enormous organizational and technical problems connected with the shift from U. S. to Soviet

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economic partnership, the strain of supporting a swollen military establishment, and finally an extremely severe drought. Once again, the U. S. seems to have misinterpreted the situation, believing that the economic crisis signaled the degeneration and ultimate failure of the Revolution itself. From Washington's point of view, nothing could have been more welcome, which is doubtless one of the main reasons it was believed. If the Cuban Revolution should fail in spite of large-scale Soviet assistance, the rest of Latin America would be effectively deterred from following in Cuba's footsteps. In the meantime, the U. S. set out to demonstrate the possibility of economic and social advance through reliance on U. S. leadership and assistance. Washington policy in 1961 and early 1962 therefore centered on launching the Alliance for Progress. Harassment of Cuba was not abandoned but for the time being receded in importance.

Nineteen sixty-two finally brought the end of the era of illusions. Politically and psychologically, the Alliance for Progress hardly made an impact on Latin America; and economically it failed even to check the adverse trends that have been in evidence throughout the area for several years now. Social unrest and political instability mounted; military coups occurred in Argentina and Peru; some countries (Venezuela and Ecuador are good examples) were beset with chronic violence; capital flowed out faster than it flowed in; inflation in Brazil threatened to send the cruzeiro the way of the ruble and the mark after World War I. In Cuba, on the other hand, not only did the economic collapse so ardently desired by Washington not take place; the end of the long drought marked the beginning of a recovery, tentative and spotty at first but nonetheless real. When in addition, during the summer of 1961, the Soviet Union agreed to step up its economic and military aid program, the last hope that the Cuban Revolution would break down of its own accord went a-glimmer.

With the announcement of the expanded Soviet aid, U. S.-Cuban relations entered a new stage. All attempts to bring down the Castro regime by means other than direct military intervention had definitively failed; conditions in Cuba were improving and gave every sign of continuing to improve; the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rest of Latin America was a shambles and the much-advertised Alliance for Progress was accomplishing nothing. Almost immediately, an unprecedented clamor for direct military intervention broke out in the U. S. press and in Congress. "What is now at stake in the decision for intervention or non-intervention in Cuba," wrote Clare Booth Luce in a typical alarmist statement, "is the question not only of American prestige but of American survival." It should be noted that this appeared in the *New York Herald Tribune* on October 1st, long before there was any issue of Soviet missiles on Cuban soil. In the eyes of a large section of the U. S. ruling class, American survival is equated with the survival of traditional American dominance over the Western Hemisphere.

This new situation put the Soviet Union in an excruciatingly difficult position. The hope that the U. S. would accept Cuba's status as the Soviet Union itself had long accepted that of Turkey and Iran was rapidly fading. The drift of events was clearly toward a direct attack by the U. S. on Cuba, and there were no signs that effective countervailing forces were developing inside the U. S., in Latin America, or in the NATO countries. The Soviet Union had assumed a clear moral responsibility to protect Cuba, and yet it now looked increasingly likely that no real protection could be provided and that the Soviet leaders were in imminent danger of being faced with the horrible choice of abandoning Cuba to its fate or counter-attacking the U. S. with atomic rockets, thus in all probability precipitating the universal disaster of World War III.

It was in these circumstances that the Soviet Union decided upon the well-nigh desperate gamble of providing Cuba with missiles capable of reaching the U. S. mainland. Again, there is no way of knowing what was in the minds of the Soviet leaders, but the logic of the situation strongly suggests that they were acting from a combination of military and political calculations.

On the military side, the missiles might be expected to exercise a deterrent effect on U. S. aggressiveness for two main reasons. First, they would permit an attack from Cuba on an invasion port or an assembled invasion fleet, thus multiplying

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the cost to the U. S. of direct military intervention.* Second, since for technical reasons the missiles would have to be manned by Soviet personnel, their stationing in Cuba would greatly increase the chances that a U. S. attack on Cuba would involve the killing of Russians with all the possible implications and consequences.

On the political side, the presence of the missiles in Cuba would give the Russians a bargaining counter they did not have before. In the event, this turned out to be their only use, with the Soviets trading their withdrawal for a (conditional) promise not to invade Cuba. We do not for a moment suggest that they "planned it that way." No one in Moscow—or Washington either for that matter—could have known in advance what the U. S. reaction to the installation of the missiles would be. On the other hand, it is highly unlikely that the Soviet leaders decided to put the missiles into Cuba without at the same time contemplating the *possibility* of their withdrawal in exchange for concessions of some sort.

If this analysis is correct, it surely constitutes proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the Soviet Union was acting to protect Cuba against aggression and that the missiles were in the most literal sense defensive weapons. Seen in historical context, Kennedy's claim to the contrary, based purely on the technical characteristics of the weapons,** can only be interpreted as a deliberate deception designed to stampede U. S. and Latin American public opinion into supporting his policy of force. It was Washington's aggressive policy toward Cuba—a policy in flagrant violation of the UN Charter and the constitutive treaties of the OAS—which evoked defensive preparations, and the

* The Oxford physicist Hans Motz argues in a letter to the *New Statesman* (November 9) that the missiles observed in Cuba, if equipped with conventional rather than atomic warheads, would be short range rather than intermediate range weapons precisely suited to attacking an invasion base and capable of inflicting "deadly" damage. "This would explain," he says, "why the sites were hastily constructed when invasion seemed imminent, although probably there were no nuclear warheads on the island. It explains why it is easily withdrawn when a guarantee from the U. S. not to invade Cuba is obtained."

** Even this aspect seems to have been falsified by Kennedy. An article by the editor of the authoritative magazine *Aviation Week* contains the following statement: "There is considerable skepticism that the MRBM's

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

U. S. reaction to those defensive preparations that precipitated the crisis and brought the world to the brink of thermonuclear destruction.

Many Americans who might be disposed to concede the substantial accuracy of this reasoning nevertheless justify Kennedy's action as necessary to the future security of the U. S. The argument runs somewhat as follows: It may be true that the missiles were installed in order to deter an invasion from the U. S. Once they are there, however, they become a serious potential menace to the U. S. They are inside the Distant Early Warning system and could land on their targets in a few minutes, with great accuracy and without any possibility of preventive interception. Kennedy therefore had no choice but to insist on their removal. This, not the motives that may have led the Cubans and the Russians to put them there, was the real issue in the Cuban crisis. In the words of Kennedy's October 22nd speech, "this sudden, clandestine decision to station strategic weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil" was "a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo" which could not be accepted by the U. S.

This argument was undoubtedly convincing to most North Americans and perhaps to many Latin Americans as well. And yet it will not stand up to serious analysis.

To understand why this is so, we must recall a basic fact about Soviet military strategy. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union has never made any attempt to build a "first strike" nuclear capacity but has instead adopted the strategy of the so-called minimum deterrent. We have discussed the rival nuclear strategies and their implications at length in an earlier issue ("The Menace of Preventive War," *MR*, April 1962) and

(medium-range ballistic missiles) in Cuba have the 1000-mile range claimed for them by U. S. official spokesmen and a strong suspicion that this alleged intelligence was tailored to fit political goals. These same MRBM's, displayed in Moscow parades for a number of years, were never previously credited with much more than 500-mile range. Using alcohol fuel and red fuming nitric acid as an oxidizer, their propulsion efficiency makes even this range with a fractional megaton warhead optimistic." (Quoted in the *San Francisco Chronicle*, November 16, 1962.) This is, of course, fully consistent with the theory that the purpose of the missiles was to enable Cuba to counterattack an invasion base.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

will not repeat the analysis here. What needs to be stressed in the present context is (a) that the minimum-deterrent strategy requires that nuclear weapons should be invulnerable to an enemy first strike (hence what seems to many people to be the Russian mania for secrecy), and (b) that they should be capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on the enemy's society and way of life (hence the Russian emphasis on superbombs capable of wiping out whole regions at one stroke).

Now it is clear that the installation of missile bases in Cuba could not possibly mean that the Soviet Union was shifting over from a minimum-deterrent to a first-strike strategy. Cuba-based missiles could at most reach only a tiny fraction of the numerous and far-flung bases which constitute the U. S. nuclear strike capacity. It follows that it is only as an element in Soviet deterrent power that the U. S. would need to be concerned about the strategic importance of missiles in Cuba. And it is precisely in this respect that it can be shown that they would have no value whatever.

As noted above, effective deterrent power must be invulnerable to an enemy first strike. But the Cuban bases were anything but invulnerable. A *Wall Street Journal* correspondent reported from Washington on October 24th, at the height of the crisis, that "the authorities here almost all accept one key assumption: That Mr. Khrushchev must have assumed his Cuban missile sites would soon be discovered. 'The Russians seem almost to have gone out of their way to call attention to them,' said one authority who has studied the photographic evidence." And K. S. Karol, writing in Britain a week later, stated: "Many military men have been astonished by the openness of Soviet preparations in Cuba, under the constant surveillance of U. S. aircraft. It is possible, then, that the dispatch of Soviet missiles should be compared with the reinforcement of the U. S. Berlin garrison at the time of the last crisis there. In Berlin, Kennedy wished to emphasize that American lives would be involved, so making world war certain in the event of a Soviet thrust." (*New Statesman,* November 2, 1962.) Whether this was indeed Khrushchev's purpose, or whether he was seeking to inform Washington of the full price it would have to pay for a non-nuclear invasion, we cannot know. But we do

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

know that it would make no sense to provide an enemy with full information on the character and location of bases intended to add to a country's strategic deterrent power. If the U. S. were to launch a first-strike nuclear attack, Cuban missiles would be wiped out by a rain of A-bombs in the very first minutes. One cannot but conclude that their value as a deterrent must have been known to both the Russians and the Americans to be exactly zero. And indeed this was indirectly confirmed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric in a TV appearance on November 11th. As reported in the *New York Times* the next day, "alluding to the Soviet missile build-up in Cuba, he said: 'I don't believe we were under any greater threat from the Soviet Union's power, taken in its totality, after this than before.' "

Who, one may wonder, was practicing deception on whom —the Soviet Union on the U. S. government by openly installing bases under the surveillance of U. S. planes? Or President Kennedy on the American people by telling them that these bases would upset the strategic balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union?

This brings us to a truth which has all too often been denied or overlooked: the Cuban crisis was and is about Cuba, not about U. S. or Soviet strategies or the global balance of power or anything else. Only it must be understood that in this context Cuba means much more than a little country of 6 million people: it stands for the revolution of the hungry nations, and in the final analysis this revolution is the most powerful force in the world today.

Here we have the explanation of a feature of the present situation which seems to be a never-ending source of bafflement and puzzlement to the pundits and the experts. By all the rules of the power-politics game, little countries are supposed to act the role of pawns or puppets. And indeed there is no shortage of pawns and puppets in the world today. But Cuba under Fidel Castro stubbornly refuses to be either.

The U. S. found that out in the very first months after Castro came to power, and it has been vainly trying to "put him in his place" ever since. When Cuba accepted Soviet assistance, the experts naturally assumed that Castro was ex-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

changing Cuba's former role as U. S. puppet for a new role as Soviet puppet. The view may even have been shared by some people in Moscow. If so, they too are finding out how wrong they were. In order to forestall what seemed to be an imminent U. S. invasion, Khrushchev agreed to pull the missiles out of Cuba and to permit UN verification. Fidel was apparently not consulted and perhaps could not have been if, as the Russians seem to have believed, an immediate decision was essential. His reaction was wholly characteristic. The Soviets have every right to take their missiles home if they want to, he said, but no one except the Cuban people and the Cuban government has any right to decide what is done inside Cuba. The following excerpt from Fidel's discussion with U Thant on October 30th (translated from the official text of the former's TV speech of November 1st) shows us Fidel as he really is and at the same time defines Cuba's position more clearly than anything else could. U Thant had just explained that the United States wanted inspection to make sure that the launching platforms were dismantled and the missiles returned to the Soviet Union. The following exchange, which also puts U Thant in an excellent light, then took place:

DR. CASTRO. What right does the United States have to demand this? I should like to know whether it is based on a real right, or whether it is a demand based on force, or whether it is a position of strength.

U THANT. My point of view is there is no right. A thing of this sort can only be done with the approval and acceptance of the Cuban government.

DR. CASTRO. We do not understand at all why this is asked of us, because we have violated no rights, we have carried out aggression against absolutely no one; all our acts have been based on international law, we have done absolutely nothing outside the norms of international law. In return, we have been victims, in the first place of a blockade, which is an illegal act; in the second place, of a claim on the part of another country to decide what we have a right to do within our own frontiers.

We understand that Cuba is a sovereign state exactly like every other state which is a member of the United Nations and with all the attributes that are inherent in such states.

In addition, the United States has, without the shadow of a right, repeatedly violated our air space, committing an intolerable

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

act of aggression against our country. It has tried to justify this by an accord of the OAS, but this accord has absolutely no validity for us; we were, moreover, expelled from the OAS.

We can accept anything that is in accordance with law and which implies no diminution of our national sovereignty. The rights violated by the United States have not been re-established, and we are not going to accept any forcible imposition whatever.

We understand that this inspection business is an effort to humiliate our country, and for that reason we do not accept it.

This demand for inspection is intended to confirm their claim to violate our right to act with entire freedom inside our own frontiers. And our present line is not one made up for the occasion, it is a point of view which we have maintained invariably and always.

In the reply of the Revolutionary Government to the Joint Resolution of the Congress of the United States, we said as follows:

"It is senseless to threaten a direct armed attack in the event of Cuba's strengthening itself militarily to a degree which the United States takes on itself to specify. We have not the least intention of rendering account to or consulting the Senate or the House of Representatives of the United States about the arms which we see fit to acquire and the steps to be taken to defend our country properly. Do we not have the aid of the rights which the rules and principles of international law recognize as the rights of every sovereign state throughout the world?

"We have never waived any sovereign prerogative in favor of the United States Congress, nor do we contemplate doing so."

This point of view was confirmed in the United Nations by the President of the Republic of Cuba and also in numerous public pronouncements by me in my capacity as Prime Minister of the government. And it is a firm position of the Cuban government.

All the steps that have been taken in the interest of protecting the security of the country, in the face of a systematic policy of hostility and aggression, have been wholly legal, and we have never repudiated our decision to defend our rights.

We can enter into sincere and honorable negotiations. But it would not be honorable to agree to negotiate concerning a sovereign right of our country. For these rights we are prepared to pay whatever price may be necessary, and this is not a mere verbal formula but a deeply felt attitude of our people.

U THANT. I understand perfectly Your Excellency's sentiments. That is why I said clearly to the United States and others: "Any action of the United Nations within Cuban territory can be undertaken only with the consent of the people and government of Cuba." . . .

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Fidel's position is that of a man and a revolutionary. Such a one will never be anybody's pawn or puppet.

As we write in mid-November, the Cuban crisis is still far from settled, and so little is known of what is happening behind the scenes that no useful comment on the outlook seems possible. But there is one point about which there has been much confusion and which therefore calls for at least a brief concluding comment.

Right-wingers have tended to see Kennedy's offer of a guarantee against an invasion of Cuba as a renunciation (shameful from their point of view) of the struggle to crush the Cuban Revolution. Progressives, on the other hand, have tended to treat the offer as a mere device to save face for the Soviet Union, having no more value from the point of view of Cuba's safety than the UN Charter and the various OAS treaties which the U. S. has signed and repeatedly violated. Neither view seems to us to be justified.

The promise not to invade, assuming that it is duly signed by President Kennedy and accepted by the Security Council in accordance with the reported plan of Acting UN Secretary General U Thant, will become a new political fact, the meaning of which can only be determined in the future. Whether it will be an effective obstacle to U. S. aggression against Cuba or a mere "scrap of paper" will depend on whether it can serve as an effective rallying point for those forces, both within the U. S. itself and internationally, which oppose aggression and favor Cuba's right to have whatever kind of economic and social system it wants. True, there are no strong forces of such a nature in the U. S. today, but it would be sheer defeatism to assert that there never will be. And we believe that a no-invasion pledge could become a powerful weapon in the hands of those, both within the ruling class and among the populace at large, who can see that present U. S. policy is not only criminal but also in the long run suicidal.

If this is true inside the United States, how much more so is it in the international community. The U. S. was able to get its recent vote of support in the OAS only on the missile issue and even then carefully hedged by several of the largest and most powerful Latin countries. With the missiles withdrawn,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

there is every reason to hope for a resurgence of anti-intervention and pro-Cuban sentiment throughout Latin America. If this happens, it is easy to imagine that holding the U. S. to the no-invasion pledge could become the basis of a great popular movement which no Latin government that was not completely lackeyized would dare to resist. Further, it is clear that small and weak countries everywhere, those which can look at Cuba and say, "There but for the grace of God, go I," will anxiously watch the way the United States carries out a new, solemnly undertaken international commitment.

The promise not to invade can neither be taken at face value nor can it be dismissed as of no importance. *How* important it will become depends on all of us who believe that its strict implementation is essential to the honor of the United States and the peace of the world.

(November 18, 1962)

OUT OF WORK, EYE FOR SALE

Johannesburg, Sept. 18 (Reuters).—A South African painter, out of work for nine months, today offered to sell one of his eyes for $140 to pay his debts.

The painter, Isaac Marais, 48, a married man from nearby Krugersdorp, said: "My eyesight is perfect and I can still keep my self-respect with one eye."

America is today the leader of a world-wide anti-revolutionary movement in defense of vested interests.

—*Arnold Toynbee, America and the World Revolution*

The greatest threat that faces America today is . . . a genuine peace proposal that cannot be refused. If the Soviets should present a sincere and reliable proposal for peace, it would throw us into an industrial tailspin the like of which we have never dreamed, and compliance with such a peace offer would result in the greatest depression America has ever seen.

—*T. Coleman Andrews, Pres., Am. Fidelity & Casualty Co., October 30, 1960.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ANDES AND SIERRA MAESTRA

BY SEBASTIAN SALAZAR BONDY

"A little news item from Lima, Peru, tells a potentially big story," begins an editorial in the *New York Times* of November 15th. "It is about Indian peasants—8,000 of them—in the old Inca capital of Cuzco, high in the Andes, clashing with the police." The following article tells what is behind that little news item. The author is one of Peru's outstanding writers, having twice received the National Prize of the Theater of Peru (1947 and 1951) and once the National Prize of Journalism. In 1961, he was awarded the Leon de Greiff Hispanic-American Poetry Prize in Caracas, Venezuela. He is co-director of the weekly *Libertad,* organ of the Peruvian Social-Progressive movement.—The Editors

Foreign observers tend to conclude, after visiting Peru, that a second revolutionary front could appear very soon in our country. We Peruvians, however, are less optimistic, not because we think the situation here is more stable than in other nations of Latin America, but because the maturing of the subjective conditions for such a revolt lags behind the evident crisis in objective conditions. The socio-economic abyss becomes greater and greater, imperialistic penetration deeper, misery more extensive, and the accumulation of wealth by the oligarchical caste more and more rapacious. Yet, on the other hand, the isolation of the nation, the "denationalization" of the masses, the repressive measures of the police, etc., also operate efficiently in preventing the formation of a clear popular consciousness and the consolidation of a revolutionary will-power. Nevertheless, whatever the delays, the zero hour will come. Many signs announce that a tiny spark can set the Andes ablaze, and though some sporadic flames have burned out quickly, reality shows that the embers are still there.

For Each Peruvian a Ration of Hunger

It is impossible to speak of the foreseeable Peruvian Revolution without sketching, however summarily, the economic and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

social picture of Peru. The overall statistics are pathetic, more pathetic than the most eloquent words. Of 11 million inhabitants (according to official data of the 1961 Census), 13 percent or one sixth of the total, monopolizes half of the national income. The peasantry especially, (56 percent of the population) receives only 13 percent of the national income. Cultivable land is very scarce, and in addition is controlled by a few: 1.5 percent owns 63 percent of the richest agricultural soil. The rest belongs to the Indians (the *ayllus* of pre-Columbian origin) and to small landowners. Large agricultural enterprises, in the hands of native and foreign landlords (such as Grace & Co.), are oriented toward cultivation for export, thus reducing the quantity available for domestic consumption. Furthermore a periodic increase in prices manifestly tends to depress sales. *Latifundism* is integrated with banking, mining, and import interests, which control the foreign exchange market and credit (the interest rate is one of the highest in the world, at times reaching as much as 22 percent.) If to this one adds that the production of energy (petroleum, electricity, coal) is monopolized by North American enterprises and that new investment avoids industry and instead flows into speculative and wasteful channels, (urban property and housing, luxury imports, etc.), the picture becomes even darker.

The peasant is the ultimate victim of the entire system. He is exploited by the landlord, the mining companies, the businessmen, even the state; all of whom gain in the long run from his low level of living. The city worker, though also exploited and despite his low wages, seems privileged in comparison to his country cousin. The Quechua Indian is not even touched by the few social laws, the possibility of individual advancement, education, or any other minimal advantage enjoyed by the worker in a capitalistic society. The nutritional content of the Peruvian's diet is among the world's worst—he consumes about 2,000 calories and about 20 grams of proteins daily, according to information from the FAO. These are averages; and since the favored segments of the population obviously have a much better diet, it follows that the farmer and the worker consume even less than these low figures would suggest—probably no more than a third of what the experts say is needed for an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

adequate diet. The picture is even more sordid if one looks at the level of sanitation (only 20 percent of cities and towns have water and sewage systems), or the level of education (each year 800,000 children are left without schools, and 60 percent is a conservative estimate of the national illiteracy rate), or the level of housing (9 million Peruvians are badly or dreadfully sheltered).

The economic and social structures have their logical political counterpart. Landlords, bankers, and importers are integrated with the managers and agents of the imperialist companies into a colonial caste which has controlled the country since independence. This caste has built up a politico-judicial structure which is democratic in appearance but definitely dictatorial in nature. In addition to monopolizing the formal positions of power, the caste also controls the parties of the Right and Center, the large and medium-sized press, and other means of expression. For the economic domination of the state, they have invented two unusual agencies: one is the so-called Registry of Deposits and Consignments (*Caja de Depósitos y Consignaciones*), an enterprise formed jointly by the six largest banks, which has charge of collecting taxes. Subsequently, after deduction of generous commissions, these are deposited in those same six private credit enterprises, which thus operate with and profit from the people's money. The other *ad hoc* institution is the Central Reserve Bank (*Banco Central de Reserva*), a bank of issue the management of which consists of representatives of the private banks—tightly associated with local and outside monopolies—and delegates from the executive branch of the government. Since the executive power emanates not from the popular will, as formality would have one believe, but from previous elections manipulated by the dominant economic interests—be it by compromising candidates through contracts and loans or through various kinds of fraud—the will of the houses of finance prevails over that of the many.

Evils tend to aggravate themselves. The population, increasing at the rate of 3.5 percent a year, will reach 25 million by 1981. Quite apart from the probable depopulation of agricultural zones, this demographic flood will greatly increase all the problems to which we have already referred. Nothing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

indicates that economic growth (despite the Alliance for Progress and other stories of the same kind) will proceed at a greater or similar speed. At the last Punta del Este Conference, it was stated that the fundamental objective of the Alliance for Progress was to reach an annual growth-rate of 2.5 percent in the gross national product per person. Allowing for the rate of growth of the Latin American population (3 percent), this would mean an overall increase of GNP of 5.5 percent. The Peruvian figure for 1961 was a bit more than 3 percent. This was more than absorbed by the increase in population: there was no progress but rather recession. And we continue and will continue to retrogress. Each Peruvian comes into the world with a ration—each year larger—of hunger. And the peasant is the one who receives the largest share in this distribution of want and misery.

The War for the Reconquest of the Communities

Perhaps this is why the peasants are assigned a decisive role in the Peruvian Revolution. That vast mass of men and women—the majority of which speaks no Spanish—is illiterate and exists outside the electoral structure, patiently nursing a most ancient hatred. It is apparently passive, without aspirations, almost beastly, in the shallow judgment of the comfortable city dweller, racist in his Hispanism and consequent Westernism. Many times torn from the land and the cattle, his traditional occupations, the Indian goes to work in the mines, in search of better pay, and there ends his days with tuberculosis. Or he emigrates, for the same reason, to the city, where he builds his precarious hut of mats and adobe in the circle of *barriadas* (illegal areas), which surround the principal urban nuclei of Peru. In the hacienda as peon, in the Andean heights as *comunero* (communal tenant owner), in the pit as laborer, in the city as outcast—everywhere the Indian shows his distrusting presence. The professional politician shuns him, for his voteless opinion counts for nothing in the democratic farce. The Left strives with difficulty to gain his friendship, which is hard to conquer due to previous and frequent betrayals. The army, thanks to compulsory military service, manages to impress upon the drafted Indian the form and manner of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

military life but never turns him into an individual assimilated into the rest of the national community. The Church, also failing to bring about his social integration, adds Catholic superstition to his inherited world of magic. A long time ago it was established that the so-called "Indian problem" is not one of educational, hygienic, or technical preparation, for the most commonplace schooling will give him perfectly useless knowledge. To one who lives in such misery, soap is exotic or superfluous, and agricultural education means nothing to a mere slave on an estate. The problem is economic above all else, and only a real agrarian reform—not the demagogic make-believe kind of Peru, Venezuela, or Colombia, which furthers the interests of the oligarchies while deceiving their Yankee partner—can prepare the awakening of the Indian people from a long sleep.

It is precisely economic factors which have caused in recent times an unprecedented collective action by the old Quechua communities. Seeing this, the plutocracy, with a McCarthy-type vocabulary, has raised its voice to the skies about undefined fidelista and Communist agitation. In fact, the so-called "invasions" of private haciendas by Indian farmers have been a spontaneous liberation movement, the further development of which can bring an insurrectional tide of a new kind to the Americas.

For example, the Indian community or *ayllu* of Yerus Yacán lived for four centuries—without counting those preceding the Spanish conquest—on a wide territory in the Province of Pasco in the Andean center of Peru. In 1619, an officer of the Spanish Crown demarcated the property of this community and gave it corresponding legal recognition. In the first decade of this century there appeared in the zone a North American enterprise, the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, which bought, with a view to mineral exploitation, the Hacienda Paria (up to then belonging to a religious community) neighboring on Yerus Yacán. The signed document between the Yankee company and the Convent of the Nazarenes took great care not to define the borderline between the hacienda acquired by Cerro de Pasco and the Indian community. The wire fences built immediately after the transaction shrank the adjacent area

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

considerably. It was in the middle of 1960 that the plunder became impudent: caretakers of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation forced shepherds to abandon their traditional lands. These shepherds were unarmed and gave way to pressure, clearly remembering that in the previous year the same foreign company, aided by the police, had massacred members of the community of Rancas in a similar situation. Yerus Yacán presented before the courts an interdict for recovery. This mattered little to the Yankees, however, for the tribunals, as they knew from experience, have their price. While delaying judicial action, agents were sent out to burn pastures and destroy huts, each time penetrating further into the communal property. In an assembly of the entire community its leaders were then authorized to advance peacefully, so as to reconquer lost properties as far as the line indicated by the 1619 document. The Cerro de Pasco Corporation and the Association of Central Breeders of Wool-bearing Animals (*Associación de Criadores de Lanares del Centro*)—a regional organization of latifundists—denounced this "armed invasion" before the government and called it the start of a Cuban-style revolution. The government sent out assault troops, and, after a waiting period to give time for an alarmed public opinion to subside, attacked the defenseless Indians and threw them off their land after beating, harassing, and in some cases killing them. However, after the first days, the Indians reacted and returned to the same lands. Then the courts of Lima took up the case, though now, ten months later, they have yet to resolve the dispute.

This case is not exceptional. Similar actions have taken place in the same region (Pasco) and in the North and South of Peru. In order to carry them out, the *comuneros* have a kind of special commando, generally made up of those among them who have had military training. They use military tactics, but are unarmed and non-violent. From time to time, the Lima newspapers publish stories about such and such a community's having "invaded" properties of latifundists or miners. The informed reader knows what is happening. Disgusted with being dispossessed, lacking official justice, the Indians have decided to take through their own effort what has always belonged to them. A justice-seeking movement is awakening.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Why?

Different factors contribute, though often not the work of professional political agitators, so blamed by those who are concerned to obscure the real issues. The *comuneros* lack any articulate political thought and do not want a revolution. They are moved by a thwarted sense of justice, by a desire to recover a possession, the land, which for them is endowed with a divine nature, the *Pachamama* worshiped by the Incas, which is the same principle venerated by all agrarian peoples. In the face of the weak support lent by the Left press to their efforts for recovery, the Indians have showed themselves wary, trusting more in the friendly (or seemingly so) elements of authority than in the doctrinaire adhesion of revolutionary parties.

Taking account of this experience, the Communists, the Social-progressives, and others of Left tendency in Peru are now placing special emphasis on attracting the rebel *comuneros* to their cause and on adding to their rebelliousness a socialistic consciousness. Up to now, however, the atomized Peruvian Left has not succeeded in devising an effective strategy. Apart from one faction of Trotskyites, they have all attempted to play the electoral game. The uselessness of this was demonstrated in the recent frustrated elections which showed that the Left cannot compete in publicity, campaign machinery, etc., with the parties of the Right and Center, supported as they are by the financial largesse of the oligarchy. The Trotskyite faction referred to began a year ago to follow an adventurist revolutionary tactic, holding up banks to acquire funds to aid peasant uprisings and organizing a still-tiny and as yet untested band of guerrillas in a narrow valley in the Province of Cuzco. This approach does not seem feasible either, both because the organizers lack the indispensable means (leaders, arms, bases, etc.) and because the peasant mass has yet to react favorably to the political call.

Basic work, it would seem, must be directed to the formation among the popular masses, especially the Indians, of a political consciousness. Unfortunately, little can be expected of the trade unions which are run by strike-breakers, bureaucrats, or petty politicians—witness the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (*Confederación General de Trabajadores del*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Perú) controlled by the social-traitors of APRA. One must start with the mood of the *comuneros* in the agricultural regions of the Andes where, besides ancient traditions of a hegemony lost through Spanish conquest, there is the picture of economic squalor sketched in the statistics already cited.

The Fire Will Descend from the Andes

The problem is, above all, one which must be solved from within. The 7 million Indians and mestizos possess a culture—in the sense of modern anthropology—however much it may have been defensively pressed into Western molds. The study of this culture is indispensable—this closed universe perceived by Peruvians of the coast and cities only in folk art, in folk poetry with its simplicity and beauty, in dance and song; or perceived by academic scholarship abstractly and idealistically, through studies of such institutions as the *ayllu* or community, and the *servicacuy* or trial marriage. It is impossible to turn the Indian into a revolutionary through mere political agitation. We must find and understand the spirit of Quechua man. It is useless and silly to ask him to use our language, our rational system, our cultural and intellectual complex, while not asking of ourselves the inverse process. The case of Peru is very different from that of Cuba. The Cuban peasant—like the Venezuelan, Argentine, Brazilian, and many another—may have been little more than a slave, yet between him and the intellectual there was a common ground: language, nationality, history. Martí, symbol of Independence, was as much in the heart of the *guajiro* as in the student's far away in Havana or Santiago. In Peru, on the contrary, though the student be a nonconformist and in favor of a peasant rebellion, there are abysmal differences between him and the Indian: language separates them, the glorious history of one tells the story of the oppression of the other. They belong to distinct nations, whether one likes it or not. The concept of integration between the two groups—Indian and white—has to be conceived of as a dynamic search of the latter for the former, and not inversely.

It is obvious that there is never going to be an effective program of reform coming from the wielders of economic power, nor from the agents of an imperialism which exploits alike the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nation's riches and its human beings, snatching from them their age-old property, throwing them into the mines to die, turning them into servants, peons, miserably paid laborers shorn of all legal rights. The establishment of the oligarchy exhausts its powers in creating a social security system according to a law which, as they used to say in colonial times, "is respected but not complied with." A long time ago, when they were still militant revolutionaries, the Apristas coined an expression: "Half-breeds cheap, sugar dear." (*Cholo barato, azucar caro.*) There in a nutshell is the formula which has been used to keep 56 percent of the Peruvian population in subhuman conditions. Now there is only one way that the sugar—or the cotton or the petroleum, the story is the same—can confer its benefits on the whole country. Those millions of "cheap half-breeds" will descend, as Carleton Beals foresaw many years ago, with torches lit in the Andes.

The ballot boxes—"representative democracy" participated in by two out of eleven million Peruvians—are part of the oligarchical farce. No one, not even those who use them, believes in them. But the other way, unless there is an explosion somewhere else on the Continent, requires a preparation which has scarcely yet begun. How long it will take cannot now be foretold, but there can be no doubt of the ultimate outcome however long it may be. The peasants of Peru must act to recover homelands seized from them, just as the *comuneros* of Yerus Yacán acted to recover their lost lands. When that time comes, the Andes will become, as Fidel Castro predicted, "an immense Sierra Maestra."

I bring you the stately nation named Christendom, returning, bedraggled, besmirched, and dishonored, from pirate raids in Kiao-Chow, Manchuria, South Africa, and the Philippines, with her soul full of meanness, her pocket full of boodle, and her mouth full of hypocrisies. Give her soap and towel, but hide the looking glass.

—*New Year's Greeting from Mark Twain, published in the New York Herald, December 30, 1900, quoted in Mark Twain, On The Damned Human Race, edited by Janet Smith.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MARXISM: RELIGION AND SCIENCE

BY JOAN ROBINSON

One of the most important contributions of Marx to the development of thought was the concept of ideology—the recognition that ideas and beliefs, especially in the sphere of the social sciences, are an expression of economic interests.

As the Soviet *Textbook* puts it:

> Political economy studies, not some transcendental questions detached from life, but very real and living questions which affect the vital interests of men, society, classes. Are the downfall of capitalism and the triumph of the socialist system of economy inevitable; do the interests of capitalism contradict those of society and of the progressive development of mankind; is the working class capitalism's grave-digger and the bearer of the idea of the liberation of society from capitalism—all these and similar questions are answered differently by different economists, depending on which class's interests they voice. That is just why there does not exist one single political economy for all classes of society, but instead several political economies: bourgeois political economy, proletarian political economy, and also the political economy of the intermediate classes; petty-bourgeois political economy.*

But Marxism itself is an ideology. Is it not then just as much an expression of interests, and just as little a branch of science as any other?

The *Textbook* faces the dilemma squarely, and hacks it down.

> Is it possible in general for a political economy to exist which is objective, impartial and does not fear the truth? Certainly this is possible. Such an objective political economy can only be the political economy of that class which has no interest in slurring

---

Joan Robinson, the distinguished Cambridge economist, is the author of *An Essay on Marxian Economics* and other books on economic theory.

**Political Economy.* A Textbook issued by the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. (English version Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1957), p. xx.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

over the contradictions and sore places of capitalism, which has no interest in preserving the capitalist order: the class whose interests merge with the interests of liberating society from capitalist slavery, whose interests coincide with the interests of mankind's progressive development. Such a class is the working class. Therefore an objective and disinterested political economy can only be that which is based on the interests of the working class. This political economy is the political economy of Marxism-Leninism.*

This itself could be treated as a scientific hypothesis. We might inquire whether the claim that Marxism is more scientific than other ideologies (on whatever criteria seem reasonable) is borne out by the evidence.

It is not easy to demarcate "Marxism," for the purpose of such an inquiry, and separate it clearly from "non-Marxism." Marx's teachings were only one element in a wide stream of thought—the growing self-consciousness of modern man as a social being, and of man in society as a potential object of scientific investigation—which would in any case have borne many ideas like his in its course. At the same time, Marx's contribution to that stream was so important and has had so great an influence on the habits of thought of his opponents as well as his supporters, that it is as difficult nowadays to find a really pure non-Marxist amongst historians and sociologists as it is to find a flat-earthist amongst geographers.

In economics, however, a purely non-Marxist doctrine was for long incapsulated in the impermeable casing of neo-classical static equilibrium theory. Here the contrast is clear cut, and the comparison, certainly, is highly favorable to Marx. The relevance, the scope, and the penetration of his analysis of the "laws of motion of capitalism" make the marginalists' scholasticism appear merely frivolous. Indeed, since the capsule was broken open from within by Keynes, there has been the same sort of infiltration of Marxian ideas into economic theory as had already occurred in history. For a discussion of the questions nowadays found to be interesting—growth and stagnation, technical progress and the demand for labor, the balance of sectors in an expanding economy—Marxian theory provides a starting point where academic teaching was totally blank.

Loc. cit., p. xxi.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On the other hand, there are certain deficiencies in the Marxian apparatus, which have often been noticed. The lack of a measure of physical output, to supplement *value* (a unit of labor-time) cripples the analysis of real income; the definition of a key concept—the organic composition of capital—is ambiguous; the treatment of the relation between the level of real wages and the money-wage bargain is unsatisfactory. And so forth.

But any such attempt at evaluation is beside the point. The *Textbook* is not inviting students to make a critical appraisal of the statement that Marxist ideology is scientific. It expects them to believe it. The appeal of ideology is to faith. With faith, science comes to a halt.

It was inevitable that it should be so. A revolutionary movement needs faith; an organized society requires an established orthodoxy. The scientific aspect of Marxism had to give way to the need for a creed.

I

The religious emotions of Communists are described only by those who have become disillusioned, which gives their testimony a tainted air; all the same it provides some evidence. Take Djilas for example:

> For the Yugoslavs, Moscow was not only a political and spiritual center but the realization of an abstract ideal—the "classless society," something that not only made their sacrifice and suffering easy and sweet, but that justified their very existence in their own eyes.

After his first interview with Stalin:

> It was already dusk as we were leaving the Kremlin. . . . The northern lights can be seen at Moscow at that time of year, and everything was violet hued and shimmering—a world of unreality more beautiful than the one in which we had been living.
>
> Somehow that is how it felt in my soul.*

When you come to think of it, there is nothing surprising in a rationalist ideology serving as a religion. Whatever it is in the biological makeup of mankind that, over all recorded ages,

**Conversations with Stalin,* p. 15.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has given rise to the need for faith, the combinations that have made religion a political force, the problems of private and public life that religion helps to ease, could not be suddenly abolished by teaching people to believe that God was invented to serve the interests of a ruling class. From the point of view of a rationalist, God never did exist, but religion always has. To abolish God does not make any radical difference. And if it did, mere skepticism could not call up the devotion and heroism to carry through a revolution, or the cohesion and discipline to rebuild society after it. A rationalist may feel that he gets on all the better without religion. But those of us who take that view have to admit that we are really parasites, drawing nourishment from the effects of faith in others. Without our professing the beliefs of our forebears, our habits of thought and behavior run in grooves which they wore out.

It is not only that rulers like to have some opium to keep their peoples tranquil. More than anyone, the leaders of a political movement require the guidance and support of an accepted doctrine. Power may quickly corrupt, but to take power in the first place mere cunning and ambition have rarely been sufficient; the leader must have the self-confidence that comes from faith.

Self-confidence cuts both ways. "I must believe in whatever is right" easily slips into "Whatever I believe in must be right." Thus all kinds of idiosyncracies, for better or worse, get embodied in the creed. The fact that Mohammed loved a widow had a liberalizing effect on Moslem institutions; the fact that Stalin was a Philistine was disastrous for Soviet art.

Faith brings in its train the persecution of unbelievers. It is evidently part of the social function of religion to inhibit natural kindliness and steel the heart against deviants within a group or aliens without.

Of all the great systems, it could be argued that Christianity, on its public, historical record, is the most bloodstained and oppressive; the most obscurantist; the most bluntly opposed to the teachings of its founder, and therefore the most hypocritical. But none is innocent. Jains, who literally would not hurt a fly, have been known to knife each other in doctrinal disputes between sects.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It seems that the illusions of Djilas and his like were the consequence of that trick of confusing ideology with truth that the *Textbook* so blatantly displays. Since their faith purported to be rationalist, they did not recognize that it was a religion and were shocked to find that it could produce just those results that, to a rationalist, make religion most repugnant.

II

It was inevitable, and in a certain sense right, that Marxism should have developed into a faith rather than a science. The notion of a scientific revolution is delusory. Action has to be taken much faster than science can work out results. Marx made the first attempt to establish the laws of motion of capitalism. His hypotheses have been confirmed by events at some points and disproved at others. To check, revise, and establish them is a program for generations.

Moreover it is not only a matter of time, but of the way the human mind works. The intellect cannot provide the driving power for political action. Science cannot propose any objective except science. The applied scientist has his aims given to him from outside his own discipline—to increase production, to reduce disease, to poison and smash up the world, as the case may be.

The analyst of history may predict that a revolution will occur. He predicts it because he thinks that he can see that the idealism, the interests, and the passions of the oppressed will bring it about, and that the balance of forces is such that it will succeed. As a scientist, his business is to investigate the process and to see if his prediction turns out right. As a human being, if his sympathy is with the oppressed, he is impelled to use his intellectual authority to give them courage and comfort with his prediction of their success. He ceases to be a scientist and becomes a prophet. No one who shares his sympathy with the oppressed can say that he is wrong. But the prophecy is useful because it is believed. It is believed because it is believed to be true, not because it is believed to be useful. Then hypothesis becomes dogma, and science is drowned in theology.

A new faith establishes itself through the appropriateness of the feelings and behavior that it calls forth to the situation

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

into which it is injected. The details of the intellectual content of its doctrines are rather a matter of luck.

This is a thought that professed Marxists find totally unacceptable. To them, achievements of the Soviet Union are the proof of the correctness of Marx's theories. This line of argument has worn thin since those achievements have been admitted to be scarred with errors and crimes. To claim the successes for Marxism and blame the rest on a "cult of personality" that Marxism was powerless to check is analogous to defending the historical record of Christianity by identifying it with the teaching of the Gospels and blaming the rest on original sin.

In any case the argument is based on much too simple a view of the relation between belief and action. After all, the British Empire, in its day, was a resounding success; and though this may have been connected with the influence of Protestant education on character, it could not be claimed to prove the truth of the Anglican version of Christian theology.

The ideology which Marx developed for the industrial working class of the leading capitalist nations has been transplanted and taken root outside the capitalist sphere. There could not but be large discrepancies between the theory and the situation in which it was applied. All the same there were elements in Marxian doctrine that were of priceless value to the Soviet system.

The notion that national patriotism means nothing to the working class encouraged Lenin's policy of defeatism which made the October Revolution possible. The belief that property is the seat of power led to the establishment of thoroughgoing socialism. Marxism cannot claim any particular credit for the development of economic planning. Planning was forced upon the system by the very fact of expropriation. Since there were no capitalists to carry out investment, some other means was necessary to fulfill their function. (Its success has now brought planning into fashion in the capitalist world, and a new ideology is being propagated according to which property is not after all necessary for control.) But Marxism can claim the credit for saving the planners from believing in academic economics. Imagine the present state of Russian industry if they had regarded

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

their task as the "allocation of given resources between alternative uses" instead of "the ripening of the productive power of social labor" by investment, exploration, and education.

On the other hand there are important aspects in which Marxian doctrines have been a drawback rather than a help in building socialist states.

To decry national patriotism was useful in 1918, but heavy drafts had to be made upon it later. The discrepancy between theory and practice has led to a kind of emotional confusion about the whole subject, which no doubt contributed to the clumsy handling by Russians of other peoples' national susceptibilities and has even permitted racism to survive in the socialist world.

Marx's concentration upon the industrial working class has turned out unfortunately since the revolutions made under his banner have been in predominantly peasant countries. The Chinese had to pay a heavy price before the doctrine could be altered. The neglect of agriculture in the scriptures is no doubt partly to blame for its poor showing in practice. The failure to allow *value* to natural resources is today being criticized in the Soviet Union as a serious cause of wasteful planning.

Marx's attitude to the population problem left a pernicious legacy to the modern world. (It was certainly necessary for him to attack the reactionary pessimism of Malthus, but he might well have given his blessing to Francis Place.)

The prediction of "growing misery" for the workers under capitalism is a more doubtful case. It seemed very plausible when it was made, and unemployment gave it a new lease of life in the 30's but today it has been obviously falsified; to continue proclaiming it in face of experience has contributed to discrediting the Communist Party with the labor movement in the West. But if Marx had correctly foreseen that capitalism was going to douse the class consciousness of the industrial workers with television, washing machines, and a five-day week, the wind would have been completely taken out of his sails. This error, like Jesus' belief that the world was shortly coming to an end, is so central to the whole doctrine that it is hard to see how it could have been put afloat without it.

Here is a point of great difficulty for the theologians. They

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are torn between denying that real-wage rates have risen in the West, and denying that Marx predicted that they would not. A recent restatement of Marxist doctrines—*Traité d'économie Marxiste,* by Ernest Mandel, temperate, learned, and reasonable as far as the commitment to orthodoxy permits—rejects the fanciful arguments put forward, for instance, by Arzumanian, to explain away the facts. (I have heard it said that, for an American worker, a motor car is part of the *value of labor power,* because he needs it to get to the factory from the suburb where he lives.) The author chooses the other way out of the difficulty, and maintains that Marx did not deny that real wages will rise under capitalism.* On a straightforward reading of the texts, especially the *Communist Manifesto,* this seems to be a distortion of the plain meaning of words. "You have nothing to lose but the prospect of a suburban home and a motor car" would not have been much of a slogan.

The contention that what Marx really meant was that the *relative* share of wages in the product of industry would fall is backed up by the quotation of a few figures which show a declining share. In this field the figures are notoriously ambiguous because of the difficulties of definition; a case can be made, by judicious selection, as easily one way as the other. But that is beside the point. The point is that if Marx really meant that he expected the rate of exploitation to rise somewhat, but by much less than productivity, so that there would be a marked rise in the level of real wages, he could have said so. To twist what he said to fit the supposed facts destroys his status as a scientist, without doing much to support his credit as a prophet.

III

But the reason why the assertion of the *Textbook*, that Marxism is a scientific ideology, does not hold water is not because of any defects in Marx's theories. It would be easy to argue that the Marxian system of ideas (though not unexceptionable) is less unscientific than any other brand of sociology or political economy that has yet been offered. The difficulty

Op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 179-183.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

does not lie in what is taught but in how it is learned. Ideology demands acceptance. Science demands doubt. A particular proposition may occur in both, but its mode of operation is different in the two contexts.

Many years ago a committee of theologians was set up to pronounce upon doctrines of the Anglican church. They decided that belief in the virgin birth was optional. But one of them, a high dignitary, felt obliged to append a note stating that, *as a Bishop*, he thought it right to state that he did believe in it. Is this not analagous to the statement by a writer on economics that, *as a Marxist*, he believes in the labor theory of value?

It is perfectly legitimate to have schools of thought in a developing subject. A school of thought is distinguished by its method, not by its tenets. Science itself, in a certain sense, is based on faith—on a confident belief that all phenomena will yield to investigation and will turn out to fit into a scheme of natural law. But this faith expresses itself in a program of work, not in a body of settled conclusions. Professor Popper seems to fall into just the kind of dogmatism that he so admirably exposes in other fields when he denies that history can be scientific.* He may turn out to be right. The well-tried method of controlled experiment is not available, and perhaps no adequate substitute will ever be found. In history every important event happens only once and alters all that comes after. Perhaps we can never hope to collect enough examples of any kind of phenomenon to generalize about them. But let us try. Let us see how far we can get. Postulate that history plays itself out through the interaction between the technical conditions of production and the forms in which society is organized, and see how much our postulate explains.

Marx, as a scientist, proclaimed this grand program, and made an impressive start upon it. But it got very little further. A school of thought flourishes when the followers continuously revise and sift the ideas of the founder, test his hypotheses, correct his errors, reconcile contradictions in his conclusions, and adapt his method to deal with fresh matter. It takes a great

**The Poverty of Historicism.*

(*continued on page 434*)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MR PRESS

CHRISTMAS PRICES SLASH

All Cloth Bound Books Unless Otherwise Noted

12. A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM? by Konni Zilliacus. Member of Parliament, fluent in the native languages, Mr. Z. talked with everyone from Khrushchev to cab drivers in the USSR, Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia.
LIST PRICE $5.00 ——— SPECIAL $1.00

13. THE GREAT ROAD by Agnes Smedley. The life and times of Chu Teh, a stirring biography woven into the context of the Chinese Revolution.
LIST $6.75 ——— SPECIAL $3.00

14. BURNING CONSCIENCE by Claude Eatherly and Gunther Anders. Preface by Bertrand Russell and foreword by Robert Jungk. A must book for everybody interested in peace.
LIST $4.00 ——— SPECIAL $2.25

15. FROM YALTA TO DISARMAMENT by J. P. Morray. The arguments of both sides explained and evaluated. Gives the reader a new understanding of the nature of the conflict, where we stand, and where we are going. Contains the complete texts of the most crucial documents.
LIST $8.50 ——— SPECIAL $5.00

16. CUBA PACKET
Combines 8 back issues of MR including 16 articles on Cuba and Latin America which will counteract the poison of the press and radio.
LIST $4.35 ——— ONLY $2.00

17. THE CHINESE ECONOMY by Solomon Adler. First authoritative description in English of the economic system emerging from the Chinese revolution. Indispensable guide to what's happening.
LIST $5.00 ——— ONLY $2.00

18. NORTH FROM MEXICO by Carey McWilliams. The "unwritten" social history of the Southwest—its agricultural, industrial, and economic beginnings with special emphasis on the Spanish-speaking minority.
LIST $5.00 ——— SPECIAL $3.00

19. CASTE, CLASS, & RACE by Oliver Cox. Reprint of a classic contribution to sociological theory. Winner of the George Washington Carver Award.
LIST $7.50 ——— SPECIAL $5.00

20. PRIDE OF STATE by J. P. Morray. The relationship of patriotism to capitalism, socialism, communism, and civil liberties examined with incisive logic. Brilliantly written.
LIST $4.00 ——— HALF PRICE $2.00

21. WELLINGTON ROAD by Margaret L. Lassell. The journal of the six months M. Lassell lodged with an English working cla family on relief. "I found it utterly e thralling, deeply moving and nightmari beyond anything by Dante or any of t other purveyors of the horrors of hum existence."—Malcolm Muggeridge in the Da Herald.
LIST PRICE $3.75 ——— SPECIAL $2

22. THE PEN AND THE SWORD by Micha Foot. The two foremost figures of Que Anne's England, Jonathan Swift, "the prin of journalists," and the Duke of Marlboro the greatest of English soldiers, cross pa The pen and the sword fight a duel. T is for you—if you like English history. ", exciting story excellently narrated. . . . tensely dramatic."—Observer.
LIST $7.50 ——— PREPUBLICATION PRICE $4.

23. CROSSING THE LINE by Claud Co burn. Very funny book by the former edit of The Week. "The most engaging of h torians, the most persuasive of storyteller the liveliest gadfly of an age."
—Times Literary Supplem
LIST $3.50 ——— ONLY $2

24. VIEW FROM THE WEST by Cla Cockburn. "The main thing to be said abo this book is that it is vintage Cockbu astringently witty, sardonically percepti the prose a delight to read."—Sunday Tim (London)
LIST $3.75 ——— PREPUBLICATION PRICE $2

25. THE WALL BETWEEN by Anne Brad Gets to the heart of the segregation qu tion. Voted "one of the best books of 19 by a poll of booksellers and librarie "Will live to become a classic on t southern situation."—Rev. Martin Luther Ki
LIST $5.00 ——— ONLY $2

26. PAPERBACK SPECIAL
SEVEN MR paperbacks in history, eco nomics, sociology, and current affair which make an ideal gift package.
CAPITALISM YESTERDAY & TODAY—Dobb
THE ALIENATION OF MODERN MAN—Pappenheim
AMERICAN RADICALS—Goldberg, ed.
AMERICAN LABOR IN MIDPASSAGE—Cochran, ed.
MAN'S WORLDLY GOODS—Huberman
CUBA: ANATOMY OF A REVOLUTION—Huberman & Sweezy
THE PRESENT AS HISTORY—Sweezy
LIST $11.20 ——— BARGAIN $8.0

All orders must be postmarked not later than

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOK SALE

D UP TO 80%

Ideal Christmas Gifts

27. THE RAGGED TROUSERED PHILANTHROPISTS by Robert Tressell. A great novel of the working class which has become a classic. "I can't remember reading anything dealing with the common people, over the past half century which had made such an impression on me as this book, other than the writings of Charles Dickens."—Labor Herald
LIST $6.00 _____ SPECIAL $3.25

28. 2 OIL BOOKS BY O'CONNOR
Harvey O'Connor's The Empire of Oil and World Crisis in Oil, boxed together in a handsome slipcase which makes a superb Xmas gift for the serious student.
LIST $12.50 _____ SPECIAL $7.00

29. THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN CUBA by J. P. Morray. Just returned from two years in Cuba, the author of From Yalta to Disarmament and Pride of State has written a thoughtful theoretical essay in his clear pungent style. Still on the press but order now.
LIST $3.25....PREPUBLICATION PRICE $2.25

30. EDUCATION AND THE WORKING CLASS by Jackson and Marsden. A study of the effect of a grammar school education on 88 working-class children in an English industrial city. "A profoundly moving as well as a profoundly disturbing book."—New Statesman
LIST $6.75 .... PREPUBLICATION PRICE $4.00

31. TIDE WITHOUT TURNING by John Gill. Before the Civil War, the battle against Negro slavery was waged by the Abolitionists. Elijah Lovejoy fought for the right to print their side in his newspaper. He was lynched by a mob. This book tells the dramatic story of Elijah Lovejoy and his fight for freedom of the press.
LIST $4.50 _____ BARGAIN $1.25

32. THE UNITED STATES, CUBA, AND CASTRO by William Appleman Williams. This clearly-reasoned, penetrating study by the well-known Wisconsin Professor of History is on the press. A must for anyone interested in Cuba.
LIST $3.25....PREPUBLICATION PRICE $2.25

33. REPORT TO THE STOCKHOLDERS AND OTHER POEMS by John Beecher. "Beecher is a product, and a proponent, of the great unfinished American Revolution," Time said of his first book of poetry. This book is his seventh. Designed, illustrated and hand-set by the author and his wife on their own press, this handsome book of poems is a collector's item. The MR Press edition, photo offset from the original which sold in numbered and signed copies for $10, is a beautiful Xmas gift.
LIST PRICE $3.00 _____ PREPUBLICATION PRICE $2.00

Suggested order form below. If you do not want to cut your magazine, send your order on a separate paper listing the numbers you want. Please be sure to enclose correct payment with name and address printed plainly.

Monthly Review Press 333 Sixth Avenue, New York 14, N. Y.

Enclosed find $..... Please rush to me, postage paid, the selections circled below.

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

Name .....

Address .....

City ..... Zone ..... State .....

31. Titles go up to list price again on January 1

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(*continued from page 431*)
genius to set a new subject going; the disciples must admire, even reverence, the master, but they should not defer to him. On the contrary, they must be his closest critics.

Marxism did not develop so. Within the socialist movement, it was too soon embalmed. Revision came to mean the search for slogans to justify a change of policy. Only the highest political authorities could pronounce on matters of doctrine, and even they had to be careful to express new thoughts in old forms.

Nor did Marxism benefit from criticism from without. The association with dangerous thoughts frightened off the "bourgeois" intellectuals, and allowed smart-alec debating points to pass as a sufficient refutation of his ideas. Nowadays in the U.S. even to think about the questions that Marx raised is suspect and a great deal of mental energy goes into finding safe, trivial theorems to elaborate.

It was inevitable that Marxism should develop as a closed doctrine, not a growing science. But now the loss begins to be realized. In a settled society, when the heroic age is over, science is more useful than faith. But a switchover is not at all easy.

The case of the Bishop is instructive. It would be beside the point to believe in the now optional doctrine in the sense in which one believes in scientifically established facts. If a virgin birth happened, it would be one of those things that happen, subject to biological inquiry. It would lose all spiritual significance. He must have meant that he believed in the doctrine, not in the fact. He felt obliged to say so, not for any personal reason; his personal position was perfectly secure, with no fear of Stalinist or McCarthyist persecution. Most likely he felt that for a Bishop to withdraw belief from a point mentioned in the Creed would be an offense to many worthy, simple souls and damaging to the cause to which his life had been devoted.

This dilemma (as well as the habit of caution formed during the period of persecution) is hard to escape in the socialist world. The natural sciences, it seems, have been pretty well freed, but political economy is a delicate matter.

Not long ago, I was teasing a good-natured professor be-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hind the ex-iron curtain. I attacked various points at which it seems to me that Marx's analysis is defective, and he defended them with the stock arguments. At last I said: Do you regard Marx as a superman or, though a great genius, as a human being?—Of course he was human.—Then he could make mistakes?—Yes. Would you mind mentioning a mistake that he made?—The professor did not actually wink but he changed the subject.

There is one great advantage, however, of a faith based on scriptures. Each new generation can read for themselves, and, rejecting the filtered values of official teaching, drink from the original source. The Reformation came from reading the Bible. Emancipation will come from the application of the method of Marxian analysis to Marxist ideology.

The process has begun; but it is much impeded by the Cold War. The silly, twisted, and poisonous interpretation of developments in the socialist world that emanates not only from the press, but also from academic quarters, in the so-called free world, give ever-renewed support to the anti-liberal element within the Communist movement. Moreover, the young intellectual, patriotic though critical, is disinclined to speak up when what he says will be taken down and used in evidence against his country. It is we who are largely to blame for smothering him. Perhaps even this essay of mine will do more harm than good.

ANNOUNCEMENT—INCREASE IN SUB RATES

Because of the rise in the cost of postage, paper, and printing, an increase in the subscription rate has become necessary, beginning on January 1, 1963. You can avoid the increase by subscribing for as many years as you like, now, before the new rate goes into effect. No matter when your present sub expires, you can renew at the old rate if you act before January 1.

	Old Rate	New Rate
One year	$ 5	$ 6 in the U.S.; $ 7 foreign
Two years	$ 9	$10 in the U.S.; $12 foreign
Three years	$13	$14 in the U.S.; $17 foreign

Single copies, 50¢ as before

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WESTERN EUROPE

BY THEODORE PRAGER

The last decade or so has been a period of unprecedented economic growth for most countries of Western Europe as well as for Japan. This has been much commented upon, and many good reasons have been advanced to account for it. What has been insufficiently stressed, it seems to the present writer, is the strong element of *political economy* in this development: the impact of the defeat of fascism and of the "challenge of Communism"; the upsurge of working-class and democratic militancy in the immediate postwar era and the responses elicited by its continuing pressure, re-enforced as they were by the revolutionary transformations in Eastern Europe and also in Eastern Asia. To retain control, the ruling oligarchies of Western Europe and of Japan had to give way on a number of points; to strengthen their hold, they had to adopt a new strategy. At the early critical junctures, to be sure, help from the U.S. proved decisive, but this help was itself a direct response to the social, economic, and political challenge of the actual or potential revolutionary forces within and without Western Europe. (The much-belabored *military* threat was never anything but a myth.) Having been saved, in such countries as France and Italy, by a kind of holding operation of the American military authorities, and having been provided with working capital through the Marshall Plan, the ruling classes of Western Europe (and Japan) were able to launch out on an expansionist course which has carried far beyond the prewar stage of productive development and which has provided the basis for a mass-consumption society unknown, so far, outside the U.S.

Theodore Prager took his Ph.D. in Economics at the London School of Economics and worked for several years for Political and Economic Planning (PEP). Since returning to his native Austria he has been active in the labor movement and has written books and numerous articles in the fields of economic theory and policy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Let us go back for a moment to the starting point of 1944-1945. Fascism was smashed—not by the Allies alone but (outside Germany and Japan) with the decisive help of local patriotic resistance armies under the undisputed leadership of the working class and its militant parties. The resistance and working class movement emerged as, in an important sense, the leading force of the nation, restoring law and order, getting the public utilities going, organizing food distribution, re-starting production, and in many cases taking over basic administrative jobs—until the Allies started interfering. The old ruling class was largely discredited because so many of its leading representatives had collaborated with the Germans or Quisling governments. Many employers had run away or were in hiding; their factories were put under public control and were in fact got going by the workers and technicians on the spot. Coalition governments were formed, including Communists, and committed themselves to far-reaching promises of social reform. Large-scale measures of nationalization followed in countries such as France, Belgium, and Austria; while Italy's large state-owned industrial sector (a legacy of the bankruptcies and state salvaging operations of the 1930's) was kept intact and later extended by the growth of new state-owned enterprises. Even in West Germany important concerns were for a time taken over and managed by the Länder, and it was entirely in line with the public mood of the day when the legislature of North Rhine-Westphalia passed a decree nationalizing steel and coal. (Ironically enough, this was vetoed by the same British Labor government which had passed, or was about to pass, nationalization laws covering British coal and steel, among other industries.) Nationalization of industry was, as it has been put, "the touchstone of the new morality," aimed at breaking private monopoly power, punishing the collaborators, inaugurating an industrial democracy, etc. (Mario Einaudi, ed., *Nationalization in France and Italy,* Ithaca, N. Y., 1955, pp. 23-24.)

This industrial democracy was, of course, never realized; the old social structure was restored substantially intact. By a mixture of blackmail and the promise of outside aid, the old guard gradually tightened its hold again. When everything was scarce, it was easy to block production altogether if so desired.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Blueprints disappeared and know-how was withheld; there were credit bottlenecks and raw material shortages, often engineered from on high so as to browbeat the workers back into "discipline" and into a re-acceptance of the old property and power relations. Thus, the "indispensability" of the old masters and their order was demonstrated. Where, as in France, the Communists had an important say in the nationalized industries, their "control or dominant influence was broken through a complicated process of amendments and interpretations of the nationalization acts." (*Ibid.*, p. 7.) Here, as elsewhere, they and their allies were eventually pushed out of the government. The onset of the Cold War and, in 1948, the final establishment of working-class power in Czechoslovakia, speeded the adoption and implementation of the Marshall Plan. Aided by Marshall-dollars and, alternatively, by the threat of their being withheld, the oligarchies of Western Europe fully re-established their sway.

Yet, they had had to give way at some important points. Large sections of industry and also of banking, transport, and power stayed nationalized for good. Social legislation had been pushed forward. Full employment, rising living standards, and (though more evasively) a degree of "co-determination" by the workers in the running of industry had been promised and bits and pieces of the appropriate machinery set up. Production targets were set and national development plans worked out. In some countries it was the trade unions which put forward local, regional, and industrial development plans, and eventually enforced at least their partial implementation. A continuing policy of "retrenchment" and stern "discipline" proved impossible. It might have seemed the "rational" and even inevitable thing to do to close down this factory or that mine, but it was not done because, as Professor Ernesto Rossi has commented on an early postwar American-inspired proposal to close down some half dozen of Italy's shipyards, "in the present economic and political condition of the country, no government has the strength needed to close down industrial plants giving employment to tens of thousands of workers. *Only within the framework of an expanding economy could such a decision become politically possible.*" (*Ibid.*, p. 217.)

Expansion, development, growth—these became the key

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

words. For there was a keen awareness that capitalism must "deliver the goods"—or else get out. There was still the fresh memory of 1944-1945, of the time when the "captains of industry," the bankers, the big-wigs, and all the men whose word had been law, were hardly to be seen and when it had been the workers and their organizations which had brought order into the chaos; there was still pride and self-confidence abroad among the shop stewards and trade union spokesmen who really did speak for the thousands; there was the shock of Czechoslovakia, the spectre of working-class power not so far away. One thing was clear: stagnation as in the thirties, mass unemployment, hunger in the midst of plenty would simply not be tolerated any longer and had therefore to be avoided at (almost) any cost.

The Experience of Italy

Consider the case of Italy* where there had been complete economic stagnation throughout the interwar period and where even the fascist drive for self-sufficiency and war preparation had made hardly any difference. At first, the ruling bloc of big industrialists and landowners tried to go back to the prewar set-up of part-feudal, part-monopolistic privilege buttressed by state protection against competition from outside and working-class pressure from below. But this proved impossible, in the face of the newly released energies of the workers and peasants (including sharecroppers and landless laborers) who demanded jobs, land, higher standards, democratic reforms. The ruling groups and their governments had to give up their policy of "retrenchment," of absolute wage restraint, of arbitrary dismissals, of narrow cartel practices, of keeping the South completely backward and a stagnant pool of underemployed labor. Pressed by their own "underlying population" (which refused to lie under quietly) and prodded by the Americans (representa-

* This part is largely based on material provided at a conference organized by the Instituto Gramsci of Rome on "Tendencies of Italian Capitalism" in March, 1962. The main reports of the conference (especially those of Antonio Pesenti and Vincenzo Vitello on "Tendenze attuali del capitalismo italiano" and of Giorgio Amendola on "Lotta di classe e sviluppo economico dopo la liberazione") have since been published in *Politica ed Economia,* Rome, 3-4 (1962).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tives of a more "enlightened" capitalism), they were forced to adopt a new, more dynamic strategy and to embark on a program of modernization and development which has transformed Northern Italy into a modern industrial area of mass production and mass consumption, and which has even begun to change the South.*

True, this was accomplished in the main by wholly capitalist methods of accumulation, the big combines adopting ruthless productivity drives (thinly coated by "human relations") within, and equally ruthless marketing methods (embroidered by "public relations") without. If the state lent a big hand, e.g. by providing FIAT with a ready-made steel works for the production of its car bodies, with *autostradas* for its cars to run on, with protection against foreign competition, and with subsidies to start subsidiaries in the South, etc., this was only in line with an old tradition by which the state had from the start played a major part in helping late-coming Italian industry to its feet. And if there were contributing factors in Italy's postwar economic miracle, such as the discovery and utilization of new and cheap domestic sources of energy by state-owned enterprises, this, too, was nothing unique: it has happened elsewhere. What was, however, a novel feature of the situation was the part played by the *political* element: the impact of the tremendous class struggles waged in town and country both for immediate demands and for more far-reaching "structural" reforms.

Without these, there might easily have been a reversal to the old sloth or, at best, certain wage increases and a measure of social legislation. As it was, the never-ending battles carried forward from below forced the ruling groups to reconsider their policy. This was no smooth process; the old guard fought back hard, alternately using the weapons of police

* There are close parallels with Japan. Lecturing in Vienna recently, Professor Ichiro Nakayama of Tokyo University stated that important contributing factors to Japan's unprecedented postwar rates of growth were (a) a thoroughgoing agrarian reform by which two thirds of the big landowners' property passed over to their previous tenants, raising agricultural productivity and purchasing power; (b) the emergence, almost overnight, of trade unions with some six million members which, "have at least made it impossible to base Japan's international competitive strength, as of old, on the rigid keeping down of domestic wages."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

terror and of discrimination within the factories as well as outside, and then again falling back upon such time-honored methods as credit restriction and retrenchment. There is, however, a fairly clear line from the formulation of demands and programs by the workers' and peasants' organizations and the fight developed around these demands to such expansionist measures and policies as were eventually adopted; from the fight against dismissals and factory closures to the "social" policy of the De Gasperi governments with their public works programs; from the fight for agrarian reform and industrial development in the South to the breaking up of the absentee landlords' latifundia and the setting up of the Cassa del Mezzogiorno; from the trade unions' local and regional development programs and their Piano del Lavoro to the official Schema Vanoni (a ten-year development plan for the liquidation of structural unemployment); from the fight for jobs and higher wages to the overhaul of production methods in industry; from the fight for the retention of IRI (the state holding company which owned stock in industry, transport, banking, etc.) and in defense of ENI (the state-owned natural gas and oil combine) to the eventual securing of the status of these institutions and their secession from Confindustria (the Employers Federation of Industries); from the demand for the nationalization of the key monopolies to the electoral pledge given by the new Center-Left government to nationalize electricity.

Thus, the policy of "presenza," of being on the spot and continually putting forward constructive proposals, backed by persistent mass struggles, has forced the ruling circles, as the Italian Marxists put it, to consider in a different way the evolution of Italian capitalism, to adopt a more dynamic vision of the process of accumulation and a line of action which in some way corresponds more to the general interest. "The struggle of the working class and its allies," they claim, "and their action, were an important element which has affected the results of economic development and which has already modified the general situation in which this evolution has proceeded."*

"Naturally," they add, "their [the monopolists'] aim has

* Report of Pesenti and Vitello cited above.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

remained the strengthening of their class power," and certainly, it is admitted, theirs was the lion's share in the benefits of Italy's economic miracle. Nevertheless, the monopolists did not succeed in "integrating" the working class into their system; despite expansion and boom, "social tension" has not been reduced. The working class has retained its moral and political autonomy, preserved its unity, and is fighting on for such structural changes as will solve those problems of imbalance—social, inter-industrial, regional, "infrastructural"—which have not and cannot be resolved even within a strongly expansionist capitalist setting. It is possible, say the Italian Marxists, with continuing pressure, to force through such public measures and interventions as will eventually take on an anti-monopolist character and will correspond, not to the "logic" of private-enterprise capitalism and the profit motive but to the national interest. In the last analysis, they assert, it is the class struggle and its course which decides the transformation of the nature and function of state capitalism. But all this should of course, they add, be seen in the wider setting of the changing relation of forces on a world scale, the competition of the social systems, and its impact on the class struggle within the several capitalist countries.

Objective Differences and Subjective Failures

The question arises, can the Italian "case," which has been described here at some length, be taken as typical for Western Europe as a whole?

In many ways, I believe it can. There have been similar rates of growth elsewhere, notably in West Germany, France, Austria, and—in a lesser degree—Holland. Here, as in Italy, the motive forces have largely been political: a response, by the ruling class (backed by their American counterparts), to the challenge presented to its leadership by the forces of a "new democracy" within and without. Everywhere, there is a highly organized working-class movement, with a live socialist tradition (changes of program by the official leadership notwithstanding), and nearly everywhere there is a militant Left. (West Germany looks like an exception, but here it can surely be argued that East Germany, for all its shortcomings, provides

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the challenge to West German monopoly capital which the official West German labor movement fails to provide.) There is everywhere the experience and memory of 1944-1945, of the moral bankruptcy of a ruling class that had embraced fascism, and of the part played by the working class as the leader of the patriotic resistance struggle and the initiator of postwar reconstruction. There is everywhere a large state-owned and state-controlled sector, at least a potential instrument of an expansionist and even anti-monopolist policy; and there are government pledges everywhere to ensure full employment, productive development, and rising living standards. Governments, parties, politicians can and are being taken at their word and required to see that these pledges are fulfilled. There is the tremendous social transformation going on in Eastern Europe and the implicit challenge to the West to ensure economic growth and social advance.

The oligarchies of Western Europe have, in the last decade or so, been fairly successful in meeting this challenge, and we are everywhere beginning to have the attributes of an "affluent society." But this goes for Italy, too. Why, then, the visible difference in the political profile? Why are the Italian militants, and they alone, justified in claiming that in their country there has been no "saturation," no "integration" of the working class into the dominant order, that the demand for "structural changes" in Italy is no mere slogan or "Sunday" affair but a central issue which has "gripped the masses"? Why is it that the Italian oligarchy, with all the concentrated material and political power at its disposal, has not been able to stabilize its hold in the way in which, say, the French, let alone the German, has?

Certainly, part of the answer is that in the other Western European countries, industrialization took place at a far earlier date. There, capitalism has been consolidated for a long time; social legislation has been broad and long-established; the mass of sheer poverty has been less; there have neither been such social nor such regional gulfs as in Italy; Social Democracy has been more successful; the dead weight of mere reformism has been—and is—far greater, and so is the extent of undisguised class collaboration (or "social partnership," as the fashionable

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

saying now goes). As compared with Germany, France, Belgium, etc., Italy has been a "have not" nation, and to some extent still is, even though it has pulled up considerably.

But while these objective and historical differences explain much, they surely do not explain everything. "Austro-Marxism" used to be famed for its ability to explain everything that ever happened in terms of objective conditions and historical necessities. This was usually tantamount to explaining away one's own failures. It seems to me that this undesirable habit has lately spread elsewhere, and that all of us, in Western Europe at least, could profit by "learning Italian."

BOUND AND UNBOUND VOLUMES OF MR

	Volume	Bound	Unbound
1	May 1949 - Apr. 1950	$ 12	$ 9
2	1950 - 1951	24	20*
3	1951 - 1952	10	7
4	1952 - 1953	10	7
5	1953 - 1954	12	9
6	1954 - 1955	10	7
7	1955 - 1956	10	7
8	1956 - 1957	10	7
9	1957 - 1958	12	9
10	1958 - 1959	12	9
11	1959 - 1960	9	5
12	1960 - 1961	12	9
13	1961 - 1962	9	5
	Entire Set	152	110

* Vol. 2, No. 5 not available in unbound sets.

Some of our earlier issues are out of stock. If any readers have copies of the following numbers and would return them to us, we will gladly exchange for any one of our MR Press Books: Vol. 2, Nos. 5, 7, and 8.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

An Old Story, with Variations

President Kennedy has faced the issue of socialism-Communism in Cuba since he took office in January 1961. During those two years he has watched the Cuban Revolution shake itself together and harden under outside pressure (chiefly from Wall Street and Washington, plus thousands of Cuban expatriates who wait impatiently in Miami and other cities for The Day when they can return to a homeland purged of Castroism by United States intervention).

Under the Eisenhower administration Cuban refugees in the United States were given generous economic aid and promised political support. President Kennedy stepped up the economic aid and took over from his predecessor the program of political assistance aimed at the liquidation of Castro through an invasion of Cuba, financed, armed, transported, and convoyed by Washington, but manned by anti-Castro Cubans. The invasion took place on April 17, 1961.

Three days later, on April 20, President Kennedy, smarting under the avalanche of criticism which followed the fumbled invasion disaster, made a militant, defiant speech which said, in effect, that Castro and Castroism must be driven out of the Americas—by the Organization of American States if possible. Should the OAS fail to act, Mr. Kennedy said, "Then I want it clearly understood that this government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations, which are to the security of our nation."

Eighteen months passed. President Kennedy was in the later stages of a political campaign that might, in its outcome, change the political complexion of a hundred cities, of a score of states, of the entire nation. If the Republicans came out on top, President Kennedy's career might well be ended. It was as simple and personal as that.

Three years prior to Mr. Kennedy's nomination by Big Business and confirmation at the 1960 election, United States

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economy began to stagnate. Despite desperate efforts to revive and restore it, it has remained stagnant for five years, with extensive idle production capacity and widespread unemployment.

During the 1962 political campaign, Republican spokesmen charged the Kennedy administration with softness toward the Communist conspiracy to use Cuba as a base for taking over the West Indies, Central America, and South America, climaxing with a Communist takeover of the United States. They demanded action that would drive Castroism out of Cuba and exclude socialism-Communism from the Americas.

President Kennedy was personally and deeply involved in the 1962 election campaign. He was far more concerned over the outcome of the presidential election in November, 1964.

Clearly the first task was to win the 1962 election by a handsome margin, liquidate the new recession into which United States economy seemed to be slipping, end the Cuban crisis, and thus pave the way for a successful outcome of the anti-Communist military adventure in Vietnam and the nagging crisis over Berlin. Japan, Italy, and Germany during the 1930's pulled themselves out of economic stagnation by engaging in local Asian, African, and European wars. Could not a well-managed minor war meet all of Mr. Kennedy's domestic and foreign headaches by unifying the country behind a war president?

President Kennedy, in mid-October, began a transcontinental campaign tour. For days the press and the air had been filled with charges and counter-charges concerning Soviet bases and Soviet missiles only 90 miles from the North American mainland. Dramatically, the President abandoned his speaking tour, flew back to Washington, held a series of conferences with his advisers, and announced a radio talk for Monday, October 22. The nation and the world listened breathless while the President stated that "the Soviet military build-up on the island of Cuba" provides "a nuclear-strike capacity against the Western Hemisphere," and thus "constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas." The President called this build-up "a deliberate provocation." He added:

Aggressive conduct, if allowed unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war. . . . Our policy has been one of patience

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and restraint, as befits a peaceful and powerful nation which leads a worldwide alliance. We have been determined not to be diverted from our central concerns by mere irritants and fanatics. But now futher action is required. . . . Acting, therefore, in the defense of our own security and of the entire Western Hemisphere . . . I have directed that the following initial steps be taken immediately:

First: To halt this offensive build-up, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba. . .

Second: I have directed the continued and increased close surveillance of Cuba and its military buildup.

Third: It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.

Fourth: As a necessary military precaution, I have reinforced our base at Guantánamo. . . .

U.S. News & World Report (November 5, 1962) hailed the contents of the Kennedy speech thus: "Here are the words that alerted the world, put the U.S. on a virtual war footing, and opened a clear path for a Cold War showdown with Moscow."

A righteous cause, "defense of the Western Hemisphere," had been presented to the Kennedy administration. A way had been found for the invasion of Cuba; for the elimination of Castro; if all went according to plan, for an easy election victory in November, 1962; for the postponement of the threatened 1963 recession, and success in the 1964 presidential elections. Republican politicians pledged support to a Democratic war president. All was ready for the count-down.

Something New under the Sun

Thus far the Cuban crisis had followed the traditional power-politics formula of Cold War build-up and challenge by one of the parties to the dispute. The next step should have been an acceptance of the challenge by "the enemy" and the release, forthwith, of the first flight of guided missiles in the opening phase of a general nuclear war.

Instead of following the traditional pattern, however, the Cuban crisis broke down into a series of variations:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

First Variation. A planetwide outburst of unofficial and official approval, disapproval, and protest from allies, enemies, and neutrals. The Kennedy challenge did not produce a war. It released an international uproar which speedily became a debate: "Should the Cuban crisis be settled by war?"

Second Variation. Instead of releasing guided missiles, all three parties to the dispute over Cuba's arms build-up hastened to the United Nations, calling for an emergency meeting of the Security Council to hear their cases and back up their contentions.

Third Variation. Fifty small-nation members of the United Nations called upon the Acting Secretary General to intervene on their behalf in the discussion over Cuba. This move made the United Nations, speaking in the name of the little nations, a party to the dispute over the Cuban crisis.

Fourth Variation. The "enemy," instead of accepting the Kennedy challenge and launching a nuclear war, issued a statement on October 23 which called upon the United States to cease aggressing against Cuba and keep the peace. The statement reviewed the warlike measures announced by President Kennedy on the previous evening. It continued: "The United States of America is taking a step along the road of unleashing a thermonuclear world war." The statement then posed the question: "Who gave the United States the right to assume the role of the master of destinies of other countries and peoples? . . . Cuba belongs to the Cuban people and only they can be masters of their destiny. . . . The Soviet Union's assistance to Cuba is aimed solely at enhancing Cuba's defense potential."

The next day, October 24, Premier Khrushchev, answering a letter from Bertrand Russell, wrote: "The Soviet government will not make any reckless decisions. . . . We shall do everything in our power to prevent war from breaking out." Forthwith the Soviet Union began dismantling its bases in Cuba and withdrawing its missiles.

The Soviet authorities further stated on October 23rd:

> The leaders of the United States must, at last, understand that times have changed completely. Only madmen bank on a policy "from positions of strength" and believe that this policy will bring any success, will help to make it possible to impose

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

their order upon other states. . . . The Soviet Government calls upon all governments and peoples to raise their voices in protest against the aggressive actions of the United States of America. . . . The Soviet Government will do everything in its power to thwart the aggressive designs of the imperialist circles of the United States, to safeguard and consolidate peace on earth.

President Kennedy, on his part, had made two reckless, provocative, warlike declarations (April 20, 1961, and October 22, 1962). The October 22nd speech challenged the "enemy" in the name of "the peace and security of all the Americas." The "enemy" answered the challenge with statesmanlike wisdom and restraint, in the name of peace and humanity.

Another Southern Neighbor

Toward the end of his October 22nd radio talk, President Kennedy turned from his United States audience and spoke directly to the Cuban people:

> I speak to you as a friend, as one who knows of your deep attachment to your fatherland, as one who shares your aspirations for liberty and justice. . . . Now your leaders are no longer Cuban leaders. They are puppets and agents of an international conspiracy. . . . Your lives and lands are being used as pawns by those who deny you freedom. . . . Cubans today look forward to the time when they will be truly free.

In 1961, we were in Cuba, before the State Department barrier was erected against travel there. At the same time we visited a dozen countries in Central and South America, among them El Salvador. El Salvador has been "truly free" since it won its independence from Spain in 1821. Representatives of El Salvador in the Organization of American States vote solidly with the State Department.

Each month the Organization of American States issues a magazine *Americas*. The September 1962 issued carried a long article on "truly free" El Salvador.

El Salvador is one of the tiny countries of Central America. Its land surface is about equal to that of New Jersey. Its population is about the same as Brooklyn. El Salvador's chief occupation is farming. We would like to translate four items from the *Americas* article. The first concerns the size of farms.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

El Salvador has 1,530,325 hectares of cultivable land. "Of this total, 1,029,260 hectares belong to only 7,130 enterprises, each having 30 or more hectares, while the remainder, or 500,705 hectares, are divided into 167,074 enterprises of less than 30 hectares. . . . Eighty percent of these enterprises contain less than 5 hectares." Two-thirds of El Salvador's cultivable land is in the hands of 4.2 percent of the landowners, and is worked by peons.

Second Item. Like farm workers everywhere, those of El Salvador have their troubles. "The situation of the Salvadorean farm workers is, in general, very bad, though comparable to that in the majority of countries in Central and South America." Wages are low and vary widely. The minimum for men is 13 cents a day; the maximum, $1.64; for women, the minimum is 6 cents and the maximum is $1.80. The average daily wage for permanent workers is: men, 43 cents; women, 39 cents; minors of 16 years, 34 cents.

Third Item. These wages buy a diet that yields around 1900 calories per day, "far below the minimum required by a normal adult, which is 2800 calories. Besides, it is deficient in vitamins and mineral elements indispensable for human life. . . . In the north of the country, where small proprietorship predominates, and where agricultural exploitation is not capitalist in form, the diet is a little better—more varied and, in some cases, acceptable."

Item Four. Living quarters in El Salvador's countryside are "lamentable," with walls of earth, floors of earth, roofs of thatch or tile. "There are no sanitary conveniences." "The houses are very small, generally consisting of one room in which the entire family and various domestic animals, such as pigs, chickens, and dogs, live. Furniture is rudimentary."

Such are the lives of "truly free" Salvadoreans, who have been under the wing of the United States for decades. As the *Americas* article notes, they are typical of Central America. Similar living conditions existed among agricultural workers in Cuba before Castro took over. The President proposes to "liberate" Cuban agricultural workers from the new life of New Cuba and return them to the poverty, illiteracy and disease which was their lot during the "truly free" Batista era.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOKS

REPLY TO MR. KOFSKY

BY DAVID HOROWITZ

The Books section of *MR* for October, 1962, carried a review by Frank Kofsky of the book *Student,* by David Horowitz, which deals with the radical student movement at the University of California at Berkeley. In view of the importance of students to the future of radicalism in this country, we are devoting a major part of the Books section in this issue to Mr. Horowitz's reply and Mr. Kofsky's rejoinder.—THE EDITORS

First let me thank *MR* and Mr. Kofsky for the interest shown in my book *Student.* As you well know, one of the more effective conspiracies of our time is the conspiracy of silence, which causes views containing substantial criticisms of the status quo, to go unnoticed (not to say unanswered) in the "respectable" organs of our culture. To the extent that they have kept the dialogue open, magazines such as MONTHLY REVIEW have performed one of the more crucial services of our time.

It is in the interest of real and critically necessary dialogue that I wish to take this opportunity to answer one of the specific points Mr. Kofsky raised in regard to my book.

I conceived *Student* as a witness to a unique historical event. This was the political birth of a new generation, a generation which had lived consciously through the last ten or fifteen years, but *not* the last twenty or thirty. For the Left of this generation, the Chinese Revolution, the Khrushchev Report, Hungary, Cuba, were the key events—not the birth of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, nor the Great Depression, nor the Stalin-Hitler pact, nor Stalingrad, nor even the great splits of the immediate postwar period.

The Left of this generation, as I saw them, had moved beyond the old quarrels and interparty struggles, not only in the fact that Trotskyists, Communists, social democrats and liberals worked together, but also in the appearance of an independent group of Marxian-oriented radicals, who had gone

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

far ahead in formulating questions without resorting to the old categories (e.g. bourgeois vs. proletarian liberty).

As a member of this latter group, it was only natural that when I came to write *Student,* I should attempt to write it as a weapon not *in* the Cold War, but *against* it. Imagine my deep chagrin, then, when I found in Mr. Kofsky's review the charge that I had fallen into one of the most bottomless chasms of sterile Cold War debates:

> Besides being prone to dogmatism, . . . Marxism, as viewed by Horowitz, is seriously incompatible with individual liberties "guaranteed" us (as long as we don't try to exercise them) under the Bill of Rights. At least I take it that this is the point he wishes to make in his closing chapter when he opposed Christopher Caudwell's essay on bourgeois liberty . . . to the first ten Amendments. This illustrates precisely what I had in mind as the failure to make an objective historical analysis.

Mr. Kofsky then proceeds to explain, at some length, that "Caudwell . . . is discussing a highly fluid revolutionary situation" in which the deposed ruling class is still a threat and thus the restriction of civil liberties necessary. "But to infer, as Horowitz does, that such restrictive measures are necessarily a permanent consequence of a Marxist-Leninist revolution is simply not a permissible reading of Marx, Lenin, or Caudwell."

The actual passage of my book which Mr. Kofsky is bringing under such scrutiny, does not really deserve attention as the statement of weighty theoretical doctrine. Rather, in this passage (p. 152) I am explaining to mass America why it is possible to say, objectively, that the student protests are not Communist protests. (This is not to be taken as a disclaimer. It is a statement of fact. The students were under heavy fire from the FBI and HUAC. Among other things, my book attempts to be a factual account for the purpose of putting the record straight. Elsewhere in the book I have stated that the Communist Party is not conspiratorial, that the HUAC is a fraud, that disclaimers are useless and pernicious and alien to the American way of life.)

In making my explanation, I list four points in which the *program* of the students differs from what I understand to be the *program* of the Communist Party USA (not Marxism in general). I say that the students support the concept of free speech "as embodied in the Constitution." I then say that "the writers of the Bill of Rights understood the guarantees embodied there as admitting no exception." On the other hand, "Communists have never, in their theoretical writings nor in their practice, concealed their

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

contempt for such 'bourgeois' notions of free speech, free press, etc., *that are guaranteed unconditionally without regard for concrete social conditions.*" (Emphasis added.) Then I quote Caudwell and move on to the next point.

I have tried to set the record straight on this point at some length, because I do attempt further on to give my formulation of certain aspects of this highly complex question, and it is Kofsky's blurring of this formulation that sets us truly, and yet needlessly, at odds.

After the last of Kofsky's sentences which I have quoted, he says: "That Marxism and civil liberties are opposed in practice—that is a widely held, if erroneous conviction. Perhaps I may be pardoned if I dwell on it a bit more. 'Forty years is a long time to wait for a free press and an atmosphere of free intellectual discussion,' Horowitz writes anent Marxism and the Soviet Union. Of course it is—and how much more so when one considers that the waiting had gone on for generations before that."

Now my book is a small book in size, and in the five pages which have elapsed between the Caudwell quote and this one about the Soviet Union, a great deal has happened. I am still hopefully (perhaps naively) talking to mass America. This time I am explaining the character of the new Marxism, as it is emerging in the hands of this very small group of Leftist students, a very small part of the entire student body.

In order to explain the new Marxism, I have to explain first the old Marxism:

> For the traditional Marxist, the social relations of men are determined by their relation to the means of production . . . therefore, the social problems that move people to action and protest in capitalist society — unemployment, social inequality, juvenile delinquency, inadequate school and housing construction — are fully solvable only when the root economic conditions which give rise to these problems are changed. In its vulgar formulation, this becomes the necessitarian doctrine that the only real problem in securing social justice is that of altering the economic substructure of society.

Then I point out that this independent group of students "who believe in a fundamental restructuring of society" can no longer accept the necessitarianism which belongs to a vulgar Marxism:

> The forty-year history of the Soviet Union has made such a doctrine, in their eyes, Utopian. Forty years is a long time to wait for a free press and an atmosphere of free intellectual discussion, and few excuses can be made for the fact that despite the Revolution there is a continuing power struggle (whose issue does not always rest on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

votes) within the Soviet Communist Party itself, a situation which hardly reflects a fundamental change in men's relations to each other.

I might have taken another tack in this critique by pointing out the fact that the Soviets have had to depend on material incentives (according to recent reports, on a modified "profit motive") to get Socialist Man to work. I chose civil liberties only because it takes less sophistication and technical background to understand. The point (and I think this is very clear in my book) is not to condemn the Soviet Union, socialism, or Marxism, but to reopen the dialogue on the real questions that concern us, namely, how *are* we to achieve a more rational, more humane world.

In the socialist world there is great ferment among Communist Party officials, Marxist theoreticians, and other socially responsible members of these new societies. The ferment is in response to real questions that have been raised, not only by the Stalin era, but by the economic and social failures of too rigidly conceived and too centralized social planning as well.

This is not to say that socialism is dying. Far from it—this ferment is a sign of health. By the same token, the lack of ferment in many echelons of the American Left, the sterile rehashing of sterile disputes, the rigid clinging to formulations long outmoded, the lack of feel for the problems that beset us now—and worst of all, the insistence that all views can be reduced to orthodox categories (and thereby dismissed) is a sign of imminent death.

And yet, this is the wrong time for the Left to die. We stand now between the end of the Cold War and the brink of oblivion. If our own country does not learn to coexist with a revolutionary China, a revolutionary Cuba, and—who knows what next?—a revolutionary Brazil, we may yet face the prospect of an early incineration. Who, better than the Left, to lead the struggle against death? Who more qualified to do it well?

But how can the Left lead the way out of the Cold War if it insists on seeing the world in strictly Cold War terms (a revisionist under every bed, a social democrat, a renegade, a liberal)? The answer is simple. It can't. To lead an assault on the Cold War, the socialist Left has to see beyond the Cold War alternatives. To see beyond the Cold War alternatives, one has to find out what's happening in Yugoslavia, in Poland, in the Soviet Union, in China—it's different everywhere: there are not two alternatives, but many.

What I tried to do in the last chater of my book (not only for mass America, but for people like Mr. Kofsky) was to peer into the vistas of a new world that is on its way and may, if there is no war, still

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

come. It is not the world of Marx, or Lenin, or Mr. Kofsky, or for that matter, of myself—but a really new world, one, to be sure, that the ideas of Marx and Lenin helped to make but one also that they could in no way foresee.

I, for one, do not grieve that Marx and Lenin could not foresee this world, because their value for me has never consisted in their soothsaying ability but rather in their power to see in the present what is coming to birth, and to foster that birth against the forces and the dogmatisms of a dying age.

REJOINDER

BY FRANK KOFSKY

I have re-read my review of Mr. Horowitz's book in the light of his communication, but I remain unconvinced that my criticisms were either substantially unjust or inaccurate. I take the opportunity which the editors of MONTHLY REVIEW have kindly extended me, then, not so much to defend my position as to make explicit in what way it differs from that of Mr. Horowitz. This, I feel, is the most essential task, especially necessary for the benefit of those whose interest in Marxism is—like mine—of recent origin.

The central point of the review, it will be recalled, was that heretofore the tactics and strategy of the "student movement" had been based on a somewhat hazily defined set of moral principles. While this foundation was perhaps a necessary one for the initial phases of student action, it was my contention that the students would have to turn to a scientific materialist point of view if they were to achieve results of any significance. My analysis of the Horowitz book was intended to illustrate that thesis; accordingly, I treated *Student* as a representative example of the tone—if not always the content—of resurgent student politics.

Curiously enough, Mr. Horowitz has not seen fit to respond to this aspect of the discussion which—let me stress it again—was the fundamental one. In my opinion, moreover, his letter only serves to confirm the evaluation which I put forward in my original review.

It is the essence of Mr. Horowitz's approach that he wrenches all social problems out of their immediate human context to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

treat them on the abstract level of exercises in categorical moral philosophy. One sees this most clearly in his discussion of civil liberties, a subject which I must apologetically refer to once again. Horowitz leaves no doubt that he looks with favor only on those political systems in which civil liberties *"are guaranteed without regard for concrete social conditions."*

This is an indication of the ahistorical, unrealistic, and regrettably superficial point of view of Horowitz's letter. It is not that the liberties which he lists (free speech, free press, etc.) are not desirable—no Marxist I know would maintain that—but simply that the degree to which they are achieved in practice will vary according to the existing historical situation. Surely no member of the American Left need be told that —despite the lofty phraseology of the Constitution and Bill of Rights—the exercise of civil liberties has never been "guaranteed without regard for concrete social conditions!" And that is all that the Marxian principle of historical specificity maintains: that human institutions, to be understandable, must be evaluated not on the basis of moral absolutes, but with respect to the society within which they function (including all the pertinent historical antecedents). Indeed, the rights which Horowitz discusses have not been put forward as social desiderata throughout all recorded history, but have their genesis in ideas originating with the Renaissance and culminating in the Enlightenment—a phase of social and intellectual development closely intertwined with the rise of modern capitalism. (Hence their designation by Marxists as "bourgeois.") To take the position Horowitz adopts, one would have to condemn all history prior to the 18th century—and much thereafter as well—because these liberties were not "guaranteed unconditionally."

Moreover, I must continue to maintain that Horowitz's criticism of the Soviet Union on civil libertarian grounds, *without the necessary historical qualifications,* serves only to confirm Cold War stereotypes and discredit socialism in the eyes of his less knowledgeable readers. I am certain that this is not what the author wishes to accomplish.

What makes these lapses all the more regrettable is that Horowitz considers himself a spokesman for some variety of "new" Marxism. Here I must confess that the idea of Horowitz as a Marxist — whether "new" or "old" — is one that escaped me completely in reading *Student.* As I have already noted, his "new" Marxism dispenses with the principle of historical specificity. Furthermore, instead of concerning itself with *causes,* the "new" Marxism deals with effects (Mr. Horowitz is "against" the Cold War—isn't everyone?—but not against the aggressive capitalist

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

imperialism that both called it into being and perpetuates it). Although Mr. Horowitz does not mention anything so antiquated as the class struggle, one can have little doubt that he would unhesitatingly jettison that theoretical tenet along with the others.

It must therefore be insisted that this "new" Marxism is neither new nor is it Marxism. Rather, it is—and I am sorry to have to say it—a subjective and emotional response to complex problems, one which condemns any effort to go to the root of the problems as "sterile rehashing of sterile disputes . . . rigid clinging to formulations long outmoded," etc., etc. When one is disposed to deal with the world on an emotional instead of an analytic basis, it is quite easy to condemn those who do not agree with your positions as "sterile dogmatists"; but unfortunately, this contributes nothing to a solution of the immediate and pressing problems at hand.

I would be the first to agree with Mr. Horowitz that many Marxists, individually as well as in groups, have often been guilty of sectarianism and dogmatism; that they have demanded the scientifically accurate terminology of Marxist class analysis by using it to vilify their opponents; and that they have often shown a distinctly unhealthy tendency to dwell among the relics of controversies long since outdated or resolved. When all of this is admitted—remembering that there is an historical explanation (not justification) for each of these instances—there still remains an unbridgeable gap between our responses to this situation. Where I would prune away some of the dead wood to save the much more extensive living tissue, Mr. Horowitz seems quite eager to chop up the entire tree for firewood. And with this tendency I cannot agree.

To enable man to understand the society of the past and to increase his mastery over the society of the present is the dual function of history.
—*E. H. Carr, What Is History?*

It takes an almost super-human innocence to muster the slightest faith in "the honest will" of today's leaders to abolish war. They speak the right words, but their actions belie their protestations. The subterranean movements of our time all flow remorselessly in one direction—toward ever mightier military machines, equipped with ever more awesome weapons of ever more total destruction.
—*Fred J. Cook, "The Juggernaut," The Nation, October* 28, 1961

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE SEED BENEATH THE FALLOUT SHELTER

BY ALEXANDER SAXTON

Lars Lawrence's trilogy *The Seed* begins with the death of three men shot down during a demonstration against evictions. The time is the first administration of the second Roosevelt, the place a "fictional" Southwestern mining town, Reata, New Mexico. In the first portion of the trilogy, published in 1956, Lawrence detailed the events leading up to the demonstration. There had been a surge of organization among the long quiescent miners, resulting in a strike against typical company-town conditions. The strikers had formed an independent union which applied for admission to an unnamed national organization (the United Mine Workers, obviously). Out from headquarters came a tough-talking organizer who promptly established back-door relations with the mine management and connived in blacklisting the workers who had led the strike. As these, mostly Mexican-American, were picked out and removed from their jobs, their places were taken by "anglos" —members in good standing of the new union.

To complete this purification of Reata's working class, local politicians had begun eviction proceedings against the shanty town beyond the mine tailings, where for several generations Spanish-speaking miners' families had lived as squatters. The result was the protest demonstration, in the midst of which there was a burst of tear gas, then shooting. Afterwards no one could tell with certainty what had happened during the moments of panic and confusion; but the sheriff of Reata was dead, and so were two unemployed miners. The violence was promptly blamed on a Communist plot; there were mass arrests; by nightfall armed vigilantes were patrolling the streets and highways; by the following morning, federal immigration agents were busy rounding up candidates for deportation.

Lawrence has thus selected a sequence of events which was repeated with minor variations in scores of communities throughout the United States during the early years of the Great Depression. A multitude of individuals, previously passive and separate, were being driven by hunger and anger into strenuous, organized activity.

Alexander Saxton is a novelist whose books include *Grand Crossing, Great Midland, Bright Web in the Darkness.* For the past 12 years he has been a construction worker in the San Francisco Bay area.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For a time they transformed the labor movement; and they threatened to change the political face of America as well. Benchmarks of that high tide are recorded today in the social security system and the unionization of mass-production industries—and by those three nostalgic letters, CIO, hyphenated to the initials of the American Federation of Labor. The radical upsurge of the 1930's forms one of the great dramatic episodes of American history. Lawrence is working a rich vein here, and one in which, given the alpine climate of cold war, he need fear little competition.

The second portion of his trilogy, composed of two novels, *Old Father Antic* and *The Hoax,* has just been published.* It recounts the efforts of the Reata miners to defend themselves against a frame-up in the making. Unable to find a lawyer in all of New Mexico willing to represent them, they send for a left-wing labor attorney from Los Angeles, who is promptly kidnapped and beaten. Meanwhile they have dispatched emissaries to rally the artists and intellectuals of the several magic mountains adjacent to Santa Fe. And they attempt the even more difficult task of seeking a morsel of sympathy and support from the rest of the labor movement. As Lawrence makes clear in some painful though amusing passages, labor in the Southwest at that time was small, conservative, composed almost exclusively of skilled trades. The much larger membership of the unemployed councils and farm relief groups could offer plenty of sympathy, but was of course destitute of cash.

The first test looms in preliminary court hearings. After a sharp legal clash, most of the prisoners are released; but those still in jail now face formal indictment for conspiracy to commit murder. The newly arrived defense attorney, following his beating by the vigilantes and a night out in the desert, is on the point of collapse with reactivated TB. As for the community of Spanish-speaking miners, clinging to their shanties on the outskirts of Reata, their situation remains desperate; but there is an echo of awakening interest from points further distant. Here the section ends, leaving these issues in doubt. The resolution—if there is to be one (and obviously also any unified critical view of the work)—must await publication of the final volume.

Meanwhile, the books in hand offer some exciting and entertaining reading. Lawrence has traced out the patterns of his embattled community in a rapid narrative which keeps the reader involved in the fortunes of a very large cast of characters. Key to this involvement is that the characters seldom fail to seem real. Since they are

* *Old Father Antic,* $4.50; *The Hoax,* $3.50; International Publishers, New York.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

spread across a wide social spectrum, and in some cases appear on stage only briefly, to convey a sense of true identity presents a rigorous test of the novelist's skill. The degree of success achieved may not be surprising, however, in view of the fact that Lars Lawrence is the pen-name of Philip Stevenson, an old-timer at the writing trade, who has had his by-line on several of Hollywood's better productions. Stevenson began his career in New York some 35 years ago with two published novels and a batch of short stories. Stricken with TB, he moved on to New Mexico, where the struggles of the Great Depression were superimposed upon, and merged with, his own struggle for survival. He went later to Hollywood, there to be honored by blacklisting; and to serve as editor of the *California Quarterly,* which perished in dubious battle under heavy fire on both flanks. Meanwhile he has contributed to a number of distinguished journals not likely to alter his income tax bracket —among them *Monthly Review*. And he has been at work for the past fourteen years on the Reata trilogy.

One of the difficulties of this work is its length. Since the sections already completed comprise four novels, and there are two more to come, the finished "trilogy" will total six volumes. This obviously has made problems for Stevenson's various publishers, and it presents no slight obstacle to the reader. Simply to acquire six hard-cover books at current prices will cost a journeyman plumber better than half his day's wage; and beyond that there remains the problem of reading rapidly enough to maintain some sort of continuity between beginning and end. The publisher claims on the jackets that each novel is complete in itself. But this is not so; and Stevenson is in fact too good a craftsman to allow it to be. Presumably he conceived the work as a whole and the sections as parts, and this is precisely what they are. To take up one volume out of sequence is like coming into the middle of a continuous movie. One gets into it quickly enough, but there remains a feeling of frustration and uncertainty. Undoubtedly the author was aware of these problems and took the calculated risk. Size in any art form, after all, is not simply a matter of greater quantity. An epic poem is not the same thing as a sonnet only longer; nor could Diego Rivera have expressed what he expressed in his murals had he confined himself to easel painting. With respect to novelists, it seems clear that those whose focus has been social rather than individual have often resorted to long works and multiple volumes because in no other way could the complexity of social movement, the sense of an historical direction emerging from countless individual misdirections, be conveyed. While length may inconvenience, or even irritate, the reader, he can

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hardly afford to reject Stevenson's work on this account, unless he is prepared for the same reason to reject some of the best writing of the past two centuries.

It may be that Stevenson would resent description of his trilogy as *historical fiction,* since it comes so patently out of personal experience, and because the term itself has been so much abused. Yet the decade of the Great Depression *is* history nonetheless—almost as remote from direct knowledge of a reader under thirty as the American Civil War. To induce an identification, to recreate the mood, the viewpoint, the success and failure, adventure, heroism, tragedy of a past era, is certainly historical fiction; and this is what Stevenson succeeds very well in doing.

One might assume therefore that he would have had the good fortune to find his work bracketed into one of the hottest categories of the trade book field. For at this very trough have richly supped such demigods of the bestseller list as Hervey Allen (*Anthony Adverse, The Forest and the Fort*); Kenneth Roberts (*Rabble in Arms, Arundel,* etc.); and of course Margaret Mitchell (*Gone with the Wind*)—to mention only one in that curious confraternity of Civil War revivalists whose names alone would require several issues of this magazine to set down in 12-point pica. So why not Philip Stevenson? His work is certainly as long (*monumental*) as Hervey Allen's; as frank (*sex*) as Margaret Mitchell's; as full of assault and battery, escape and pursuit (*action-packed*) as Kenneth Roberts'.

The actual publishing history of Stevenson's trilogy offers a revealing little sidelight on the literary life in America. Its first two volumes were brought out in this country by a major New York publisher. Though the investment must have been considerable, the publisher, for reasons undivulged, neither advertised nor pushed bookstore sales, and later abandoned the project altogether. Pieces of Stevenson's work appeared in London and Berlin and, in translation, in German, Polish, Italian, Czech. But it was not till this past summer, after a lapse of seven years, that publication of the trilogy was resumed in the United States—this time by International Publishers. For a small firm to take up in midpassage a production of this size required both faith and courage —especially for a house which must be aware from bitter experience that its imprint will guarantee the boycott as far as bookstores and reviews in literary journals are concerned.

Since the opening portion of the trilogy appeared under the pseudonym Lars Lawrence, it would be easy to assume that the series was dropped by the first publisher when it became known that Lawrence was in fact a blacklisted screenwriter named Stevenson. But New

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

York publishers have shown a certain independence in this matter, and there are several other writers of ill-fame west of the Sierras who have been doing quite nicely east of the Hudson.

I imagine the heart of the matter lies a little deeper. It seems, for one thing, that there are, within the brief span of American history, acceptable and unacceptable periods. The "War Between The States," and what is usually spoken of as the "Winning of the West" command top priority, with the Revolution now running a rather tired third. But whoever heard of a novel about the invasion of Mexico in 1846? Or about Chinese exclusion on the Pacific coast? Or—with the important exception of Howard Fast's *Freedom Road*—of a Negro's-eye-view of Reconstruction? And speaking of Fast, when he had confessed and been shriven, it definitely was *not Freedom Road* which the film-makers picked from his bag of titles.

Far from it. For Reconstruction and the Great Depression have this in common: they do not make for good boxoffice or bookstore sales because they reveal too starkly the nature of power in America. And this is the essence of Stevenson's work. Love, mating, striving, frustration, confusion of individual characters, certainly are dealt with, and often with great sensitivity. But to all these individuals, the dominating factor is the relation to power, which means in Reata the absentee ownership of the mine, acting through the machinery of government to control the many and benefit the few. What makes the Great Depression unique in American history is that this consciousness then reached the surface. It was spoken in words. It became the base of rational action for a significant number of people. Historically, the Communist Party provided one of the major vehicles for this swing to radicalism, to Marxism; and in Reata, Communists played a leading role. It happened; it could scarcely have been otherwise; yet in recording the fact, and in offering realistic portrayals of Communists as people, or people as Communists, Stevenson has violated the ultimate taboo of postwar America. Editors, reviewers, booksellers, can only make the sign of the cross and turn away. If they were alive during the 1930's, they remember nothing. They have seen nothing, heard nothing, thought nothing.

Well, so much for that. For the time being at least, Stevenson's trilogy will not be reviewed in the *New York Times*, nor will it be read by many people in this country. Yet it is, I believe, a contribution to American literature. It transcribes an important segment out of the past into the present tense of direct experience. And in so doing, it may help to preserve the almost forgotten legend that once upon a time (long long ago) when the emperor

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

went riding naked through the streets, there were not just a few people, but a whole lot, who saw and said to each other, *let's get rid of the nut before he has us in straitjackets.* This, of course, is what makes the 30's so frightening to the 60's. That Stevenson lacks neither patience nor hope may be inferred from the title he has given his trilogy as a whole: *The Seed.* Stendhal is said to have remarked about the novel *Le Rouge et le Noir* that it would not be properly appreciated for a hundred years. But that was in duller times than these.

3 books on press—ready for Xmas

The United States, Cuba, and Castro

by WILLIAM A. WILLIAMS

Price on publication—$3.25
Prepublication price—$2.25

The Second Revolution in Cuba

by J. P. MORRAY

Price on publication—$3.25
Prepublication price—$2.25

Prepublication price for both Cuba books—$4.00

Report to the Stockholders And Other Poems

by JOHN BEECHER

Price on publication—$3.00
Prepublication price—$2.00

Send your order, with payment enclosed, to

MONTHLY REVIEW PRESS 333 Sixth Avenue New York 14, N. Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(*continued from inside back cover*)
Next month, we will bring out a pamphlet entitled *Economic Development, Planning, and International Cooperation* by Oskar Lange, Chairman of the Planning Committee and of the Economic Council of Poland, an ideal introduction to the subjects covered, by one of the world's leading economists. The price of this will also be announced as soon as possible.

In this connection, may we remind you that members of MR Associates receive all new pamphlets free (the new version of *Why Socialism?* will be treated as a new pamphlet). Why not be sure you get your copies immediately and automatically by joining the Associates?

In the front line of the shock troops fighting for freedom in the South are the field secretaries and members of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee. SNCC badly needs funds to be able to pay its heroic representatives, not salaries but mere subsistence allowances. To this end, it has produced a long-playing album entitled "Freedom in the Air" which tells the story of Albany, Georgia, in the songs and voices of the participants themselves. "Freedom in the Air" can be acquired for a minimum contribution of $3.98, which also includes a subscription to *The Student Voice,* SNCC's monthly organ. Please send contributions to Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, 799½ Hunter Street, Atlanta 14, Georgia. We would be proud to have MR readers take a large and important part in supporting SNCC's activities.

Studies on the Left announces that it will award two prizes of $300 each for "manuscripts of radical scholarship" submitted before October 1, 1963, one in the area of the natural and social sciences and the other in the area of literature and the arts. Manuscripts should be between 20 and 30 double-spaced typewritten pages and accompanied by a stamped self-addressed envelope. Prize-winning essays, and optionally others, will be published in *Studies.* Send all manuscripts or queries to Studies on the Left, P.O. Box 2121, Madison 5, Wisconsin.

We are pleased and proud to be able to announce that on December 12, two weeks prior to the publication date of *Cuba, Castro, and the United States,* the book's author, Professor William A. Williams of the University of Wisconsin will speak at the first MR Associates meeting of the 1962-1963 period. For full particulars, see the box below.

Season's greetings to MR readers from the editors and staff.

MONTHLY REVIEW ASSOCIATES
invites you to hear
WILLIAM A. WILLIAMS
Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin
on
THE U.S. AND LATIN AMERICA
Date: Wednesday, December 12, at 8:30 P.M. sharp
Place: Fraternal Clubhouse, 110 West 48th Street, N. Y.
Admission: $1 in advance • $1.50 at the door • Associates free
Send your order for tickets, with payment enclosed, to
Monthly Review Associates, 333 Sixth Ave., New York 14, N. Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(*continued from inside front cover*)

publication price of $2 until January 1. You will not find a more handsome Xmas gift anywhere.

Prepublication orders for the new Williams and Morray books on Cuba have been unusually heavy. We are rushing them to completion because of the light they shed on the present Cuban crisis. The Williams book will certainly be ready before Xmas, and we have high hopes that the Morray will be too. You will not find more timely Xmas gifts anywhere. (Incidentally, the title of the Morray book has been changed from *The October Revolution in Cuba,* as announced in previous issues, to *The Second Revolution in Cuba.*)

Please remember that MR subs at bargain prices (see back cover) also make excellent Xmas gifts, and this is especially true because of the increase in sub rates which go into effect on January 1. Introduce five friends to MR for only $3 a head, and solve a big part of your gift problem all in one package.

Some readers have asked us why we haven't written anything on China and India. The reason is that we have not felt that we had anything enlightening or useful to say. When we do, we will say it.

The footnote references in Edgar Snow's article "Facts about Food in China" in the November issue were given exactly as they will appear in his book *The Other Side of the River* (which may be available by the time this is in print) and are readily intelligible only in conjunction with the book's bibliography. For those MR readers who may want to consult the sources in question, we give the following fuller references: Footnote 5—Hu Chang-tu, *China: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture,* New Haven, Human Relations Area Files, 1959, p. 397. Footnote 7—*China Quarterly.* Footnote 8—*Ten Glorious Years,* State Statistical Bureau, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1959. Footnote 11—Foreign Languages Press.

James Council, the New York school teacher who was peremptorily fired for refusing to take part in a shelter-drill program, told *The Morningsider* (November 15) that he had been greatly influenced by *Burning Conscience,* the Eatherly-Anders book published earlier this year by MR Press. "The shelter drills," Mr. Council is quoted as saying, "being an acknowledged hoax and serving no authentic purpose or protection, merely support the dangerous lie that nuclear war can achieve something other than total annihilation of life on earth, and they also benumb the imagination to reality." We salute a brave man for acting as his conscience dictates. May there be many more James Councils in the months and years ahead!

Bound copies of Volume 13 (1961-1962) are now available at a price of $9. The prices of earlier bound volumes vary according to their scarcity (the highest is $24 for Volume 2 of which only a few copies remain), with the complete set (Volumes 1 through 13) coming to $152.

A group of 11 radical and liberal magazines have issued a statement entitled "Kennedy's Cuban Policy: a Disaster." It is available at 25 cents a copy from: Editors Statement, P.O. Box 251, Planetarium Station, 131 West 83rd Street, New York 24, N.Y.

On the MR Press Pamphlet front: (1) In the first issue of MR (May, 1949) we published an article entitled "Why Socialism?" by Albert Einstein. In the intervening years it has been brought out as a pamphlet in a photo-offset version and reprinted several times. Recently the supply was exhausted once again, and we decided to set type on it and bring it out in a more handsome and appropriate format. Price to be announced. (2) We have just reprinted (for the fourth time) *The ABC of Socialism* by Leo Huberman and Sybil May. Price: single copy, 50¢, 5 for $1. (3)

(*continued on page 464*)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If you agree that a sub to MR makes an

Ideal Christmas Gift

then consider these offers:

One gift sub for $4
you save $1

two gift subs for $7.25
you save $2.75

three gift subs for $10
you save $5

four gift subs for $12.50
you save $7.50

five gift subs for $15
you save $10

We will enclose a gift card signed as you direct.

These offers end on December 31; after that date the rates go up to $6 for a one-year sub in the U.S.; $7 outside the U.S.

Remember: every gift sub you send to a friend is, at the same time, a gift to MR.

Send your order, with payment enclosed, to

Monthly Review 333 Sixth Avenue New York 14, N. Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED